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Labor  markets  play  a  central  role  in  determining  the  mac:oeconomic  success
of scabilization  and adjustment  policies,  and in  mediating  the impact  of these
policies  on the  standards  of living  of  the  population--in  particular,  the  poor.
The  seven  issue  papers  and  twelve  country  studies  in  this  symposium  are  devoted
to  an  examination  of  different  aspects  of  this  interaction  between  labor  markets
and adjustment. The object  of this paper is to provide  an overview  of these
nineteen  papers,  and to  draw  out  general  conclusions, policy  lessons  and  areas
for further  research.
I.  Introduction: Issues  and  Country  Studies
I.1  Issues
To start  with, let us define  what we mean by adjustment  and by labor
markets.  Under  adjustment we  include both  stabilization  and  structural
adjustment.  Following  convention,  by stabilization  we mean the reduction  of
national  expenditure  to bring it into  line  with  national  income  or output. By
structural  adjustment  we mean attempts  to increase  national  income  or output
through  more efficient  use of resources. Of course,  a myriad  of macro  policy
instruments,  such as exchange  rates,  monetary  policy and fiscal policy are
available  to achieve these  goals,  which  may sometimes  be stated in terms of
inflation,  balance  of  payments  and  growth  targets.  The  links  between  instruments
and  targets,  however,  almost  always  touch  on labor  markets  and their  operation.
A labor  market  is a  mechanism  for  matching  the  supply  and demand  of the
factor  of production  labor,  through  the  terms  of the  contract  between  buyer  and
seller. Since  there  are  many  different  types  of  labor,  differentiated  by skill,
location,  g2nder,  etc.  there  are  many  different  labor  markets.  But  these  markets
are linked  with each other  since  conditions  in one  can influence  the  workings
of another. The  system  of interlinked  individual  labor  markets  in  a  country  can2
perhaps  be  called  "the  labor  market." The  labor  market  is  itself  linked  to  other
markets  in the  economv--it  influences  their  workings  and is in turn influenced
bv them.
The terms  of the  contract  between  buyers  and  sellers  in a labor  market
can  vary, from  wage payment  in  markets  for  unskilled  labor  to complex  packages
of  remuneration  and  benefits  over  time  in  markets  for  skilled  labor. The  markets
can vary in structure,  from many buyers  and many sellers  to small groups  of
buyers  and  sellers. Some  analysts  talk  of "internal  labor  markets"  within  large
firms. National  policy  and  regulation  affects  the  workings  of the  labor  market,
and the labor  market  in turn throws  up institutions  which  become  important  in
setting  national  policy.  While  any individual  labor  market  may be small,  the
outcomes  in the labor  market  as a  whole  can influence  macroeconomic  conditions
in the  economy.  Since the  outcomes  determine  the  payment  to lab,r,  they also
affect  the  distribution  of income  in the  economy.
Policy  makers  are often interested  in knowing  whether  the labor  market
in  a country  is "working  well,"  and  what can  be done to "improve"  its  workings.
But  what  does it  mean  to say  that  the  labor  market  is  working  well?  As always,
a general  characterization  is  difficult.  The  most  general  statement  we can  make
is in the context  of a competitive  general  equilibrium  model of the economy.
In this stylized  setting,  we know that if every other  market  operates  in the
manner  of  classical  competitive  markets,  then  if the  labor  market  also  operates
in this  manner  the  economy  will  achieve  a Pareto  optimal  outcome. Thus in  this
framework  and under these  conditions  it is clear  what is meant by the labor
market  working  well--it  is that the labor  market is working like  a classical
competitive  market  where  price adjusts  to equate  supply  and demand.  In fact,
in most practical settings, this is indeed the test that is applied, and3
discussion  of policv and regulation is highly colored by  the use of this
benchmark.  But the slightest  reflection  should  make clear how fragile  this
benchmark  is,  and  how severe  and  unrealistic  are the  conditions  under  which it
is viable, since in .:eality  there is no guarantee that other markets are
themselves  working like classical  competitive  markets,  and a Pareto  optimal
outcome  may not satisfy  distributional  criteria fcr evaluating  the economic
system  s a  whole.
Since the search for any general characterizati..n  is likely to prove
futile,  it is  best to  approach  the  analysis  with  a more  specific  notion  of  what
is  being  asked  of the  labor  market,  given  the  structure  of other  markets  in  the
economic  system,  and  the  particular  economic  policy  problem  under  consideration.
The particular  policy problems  we focus on in this symposium  are those of
stabilization  and  structural  adjustment  through  the  use  of  macroeconomic  policy
instruments.
We discuss  first  stabilization.  The  role  of the  labor  market  here is co
ensure  that  the  reduction  in national  expenditure  takes  place  without  inducing
a substantial  reduction  in  national  output. The  basic  mechan-isms  heri  are  well
known. As national  expenditure  falls  there  will  be  downward  pressure  on output
prices if output markets behave like classical competitive  markets.  This
downward  pressure  on  output  prices  will lead  to  cutbacks  in  production  and  hence
in  the  demand  for  labor. If  the  price  of labor  falls  in  response  to  this  reduced
demand,  then  this  reduction  in  cost  will  help  maintain  the  level  of production.
In fact,  if the  price  of labor  falls  sufficiently  in relation  to the  original
fall  in output  prices,  under  certain  conditions  there  need be no fall  in total
output  at  all. To the  extent  that  the  "real  wage"  does  not  fall  this  far,  total
output  will  be lower  than it otherwise  would  be and,  because  of unemployment,4
the  wage bill  will be discributed  more unequally  than it  otherwise  would  be.
In this  framework,  therefore,  the  test  for  whether  the  labor  market  was
"working  well"  would  focus  on  whether  the  real  wage  fell  sufficiently  to  maintain
employment  and  output  in the  face  of a reduction  in  total  national  expenditures
(Addison  and Demery,  Azam).  Clearly,  labor  market institutions  are relevant
here.  If the  labor  market  is  unionized,  and  the  union  cares  more  about  the  real
wage of employed members than about the numbers of  the unemployed, then
bargaining  between  the  union  and  employers  will  lead  to  a  real  wage  which  is  too
high for  maintaining  employment  and output  (Nelson). The extent  to which the
union can indeed  be sanguine  about the  unemployed  will in turn depend  on the
nature  and extent  of unemployment  benefit. Wage indexation  is also relevant.
To  the  extent  that  automatic  wage  adjustments,  mandated  by  national  law  or  agreed
by employers  as part  of a long  term  contract,  stop the  real  wage from falling,
there  will be unemployment  and  output  loss (Devereux). Also important  is  how
much of the  labor  market  is covered  by these  adjustments.
Although  a fall  in  demand  will  lead  to  unemployment  in  a  particular  labor
market  if  the  real  wage  in  that  market  does  not  fall,  at the  macroeconomic  level
the  real  wage is  also  one  of  the  determinants  of  aggregate  demand. The  mechanism
(as  developed  by Taylor,  1988,  for  example)  depends  on the  assumption  that  the
propensity  to save is markedly  lower  for  wage earners  than for recipients  of
profits. If falling  real  wages  are  accompanied  by a fall  in the  share  of  wages
in  national  income,  the  aggregate  demand  will  fall. Thus,  we  may  see  persistent
unemployment  despite  large  falls  in  real  wages. The  conclusion  to  be drawn  from
the  coexistence  of these  phenomena  is  not therefore  necessarily  that  the labor
market is not working well, and that if only real wages fell even further
unemployment  would go down,  but that  beyond  a certain  point the  macroeconomic5
consequences  of real  w_ge  declines  may lead  to  an additional  cost  of ad.ustment
that relies  too  heavily  on labor  markets.
Another  case  wheve  observed  unemplo  ment does  not  necessarily  mean that
the  labor  market  is  not  working  well is  where  output  markets  do  not  behave  like
classical  competitive  markets. When there  is imperfect  competition  in  product
markets unemployment  may result  even if labor markets are competitive  with
flexible  real  wages  (Azam). With  persistent  unemployment,  therefore,  the  finger
of blame can point to at least  one of three factors--imperfectly  competitive
product  markets,  aggregate  demand  feedback  from  real.  wages,  or labor  markets  not
working  well. There  is  no automatic  presumption  that  the  root  cause  is  the  last
of these.
Let  us turn  now  to  the  role  of labor  markets  in  the  process  of  structural
adjustment. Structural  adjustment  has many components,  but at its  heart is a
shift  in  the  composition  of  national  output  towards  the  proauction  of  exportables
and import  competing  output (tradeables)  through the use of relative  price
instruments  such  as the  exchange  rate.  Cleaxly,  such  a shift  in the  pattern  of
production  requires a corresponding  shift in factors of production  towards
certain sectors, and  it  is the  labor market L...ough  which  the sectoral
composition  of labor  use  is  altered. The  gaenAl  issue  to  which  this  gives  rise
is the nature and extent of reallocations  between different labor markets.
Essentially,  what  is required is for  labor to flow to the production of
tradeables  i.e. to flow to those labor  markets that serve the production  of
tradeables.  This  may  require  reallocation  across  firms  in  the  same  area,  across
the  formal/informal  or covered/uncovered  divide,  or across  regions.
In principle,  this reallocation  could take plece through a number of
mechanisms.  But economic analysis focuses on the role of temporary wage6
differentials  in attracting  labor to markats  where demand is high.  Notice,
however,  that the  very reallocation  to which the  differentials  give rIse  will
tend to  mitigate  the  differentials. If the  wage differentials  ate  constrained
between  limits  because  of institutional  factors,  standard  results  on the  impact
of relative  outnut  price  changes in the composition  of employment  and output
will not obtain (Edwards  and Edwards).  The  same would happen if gender
differences  led to significant  misallocation  of labor  (Collier). Movements  in
relative  wages  can  therefore  be a  deceptive  test  of whether  the  labor  market  is
working  well.  It  is  far  better  to  concentrate  directly  on the  nature  and  ex,*ant
of  reallocation  between  output  sectors.  The  faster  this  reallocation,  the  faster
will the desired  adjustment  in national  output  take  place.  However,  labor  is
only one of the factors of production  and care must be taken before  ,ne
pronounces  that  because  labor  reallocation  has  not  taken  place  the  labor  market
is "not  working  well"--if  markets  for  complementary  inputs  (e.g.  credit)  are  not
playing  their  role,  the labor  market  may be hampered  in achieving  the  desired
reallocation  of labor  and therefore  of output.
Whatever  the role of the labor market in achieving  the macroeconomic
objectives  of  stabilization  and structural  adjustment,  how the labor  market
responds  to  macroeconomic  instruments  will  certainly  determine  the  distribution
of income  in  the  economy. At the  simplest  level,  if  stabilization  necessitates
a period  of  high  unemployment  because  of downwardly  rigid  wages,  then  there  will
be an increase  in inequality  on this  count,  and pe.:.aps  a greater  increase  in
poverty  than  if real  wages  had  fallen  sufficiently  to  mrintain  employment. The
reallocation  of labor  across  sectors,  its  extent  and  nature,  will  also  influence
the  distribution  of income. If,  for  example,  the  initial  situation  is  such  that
the poor are concentrated  in the produccion  of tradeable  sectors,  then the7
increase  in  wages  necessary  to  attract  labor  to that  sector  will reduce  poverty
on this  count  in the  short  to  medium  run,  although  what  happens  in the  long  run
depends  on how  markets  for  other  factors  operate. One  can  conduct  a systematic
analysis  of the impact  of adjustment  on poverty  in the  prese-ce  of a  varicty  of
labor  market  structures  (Addison-Demery).  To the  extent  that  the  labor  market
is  segmented  along  gender  lines,  there  will7  be consequences  for  the  distribution
of income  as well (Collier).
It has  now come  to be  realized that stabilization  and  structural
adjustment  policies,  although  designed  to  achieve  macroeconomic  balance  in  the
short  ar.d  mediun  term,  will have long  run  consequences  through  their  impact  on
investment.  To the extent that investment  in human capital is affected  by
unemployment  and  sectoral  reallocation  of  labor,  the  labor  market  will  again  play
a  role in  mediating  the  long  run  consequences  of short  run  policy (Buffie).
1.2  Countrv  Studies
The interactions  between  labor  markets  and adjustment  thus throw  up a
number of interesting  issues and questions.  The answers to many of these
questions  will be context and country specific.  The issue papers ir.  this
symposium  .ike  up  specific  conceptual  matters  and  develop  or  review  the  analysis
on areas  highlighted  in  this  section. The  country  studies,  however,  are  at the
heart of this symposium,  sin.- they confront  the conceptual  framework  with
reality. Each  country  study  was asked  first  of  all  to  give a  brief account  of
the  adjustment  process--the  nature  of the  shock,  the  policy  responses  and the
macroeconomic  outcomes. The  authors  were then  asked  to  give an account  of the
relevant characteristics  of  the  labor  market--for example, labor  force
composition,  wage differentials  and  wage  setting  mechanisms. Armed  with these
two  accounts,  the  studies  then  provided  an assessment  of the  role  of the labor8
market  in  the  adjustment  process,  paying  due  attention  to  institutional  feacures.
With these basics, the studies were also asked to evaluate the impact of
adjustment,  as mediated  by the  labor  market,  on  poverty  and  on women. Finally,
they were  invited to consider the  long-run consequences  of  labor market
adjustment.
There are twelve  country  studies  in this symposium:  four ftom  Africa
(including  three from  sub-Saharan  Africa),  five from  Latin  America,  and three
from  Asia.  The countries  span  a  range  of  different  income  levels,  ranging  from
two  low inco,me  countries  (u'ing  the  World  Bank's  classification,  namely  Kenya
and  Ghana),  seven  lower  middle  income  countries  (Bolivia.  Sgypt,  Cote  d'Ivoire,
Thailand, Chile, Costa Rica and Malaysia), and  three upper middle income
countries  (Brazil,  Argentina  e.Ad  Korea).  The countries  also span a range  of
adjustment  experience,  which  we will  discuss  presently.
Not  all  of  the  country  studies  address  all  of the  issues,  sometimes  because
particular  issues  were important  in  particular  countries  but  not in  others,  and
sometimes  due to data limitations. Almost  all of the  Latin  countries,  many of
those  in South  East Asia, and some in North  Africa  have periodic  labor force
surveys,  although  the  data from  these  vary  in terms  of accessibility  and  amount
of previous  analysis. Few labor  force  surveys  however  cover the rural  sector
(exceptions  are Kenya, although  the survey is infrequent,  and Thailand for
occasional  years).  In sub-Saharan  Africa  to the  authors'  knowledge  there  are
no regular  labor  force  surveys,  and  nya  is the only  country  with comparable
household  surveys  for  a year in the  1970's  and  a year in the '980's. For the
two  other  sub-Saharan  African  studies  surveyed  here,  the studies  rely  on cross
section  data  for  the  1980's,  from  the  World  Bank  Living  Standards  Surveys. These
living  standards  survey  data  do have  the  advantage  of  courering  rural  areas,  and9
also  with some  ingenuitv  (e.g.  using  intformation  on length  of tenure  in  current
job, or length  of residei.ce  in current  location)  can be used to shed light  on
some  changes  which  have occurred  over time in the  labor  market.
In addition  to labor force  surveys,  many countries  also have other data
from  Employment  and  Earnings  surveys,  collected  usually  at  establishment  level.
These series  tend to cover mainly  the formal  sector  and not a representative
samnle  of  households,  and  can  sometimes  be  misleading,  especially  during  a  per;od
where  there  have  been  substantial  sectoral  shifts  and  declines  in  formal  sect.
employment  (see  for  example  Lavy  and  Newman's  1989  work for  Cote  d'Ivoire). The
Bolivian  case  study  similarly  points  out  discrepancies  between  both  the  real  wage
and  the  unemployment  series  from  household  surveys  as compared  to  establishment
surveys.
The 12 country  studies  pull together  a wealth  of information. This is
particularly  useful given that there is so little  centralized  international
reporting  of labor  data.  The ILO's  regional  subdivisions  (PREALC,  JASPA,  and
ARTEP)  do collate  and report  information  within  the respective  regions (Latir
America,  Africa  and  Asia). However  the  ILO  yearbook  for  example  (the  ba3is  for
Johnson's  1986  work) is spotty  in terms  of country  coverage  and seems  to rely
on  establishment  survey results rather than the  (arguably)  more reliable
household survey data.  The country studies  here contain noL only whatever
aggregate  data  are  available,  but  in  many  cases  also  contail  original  econometric
analyses  (both  micro  and  macro)  of the  data.
Although  for some  countries  the  workings  of the labor  market  have  been
well studied,  there are relatively  few previous  comparative  studies of the
effects  of the  crisis  of the  late  1970's  and  1980's. Fallon  and  Riveros  (1988),
Johnson (1986),  and ILO (1987)  compare  a range  of countries,  Ghai (1987)  and10
JASPA  ('1988)  examine African  countries, and  there is work  on Latin America,
e.£. b5 Ri-csos  (1989). Garcia and Tokmar  (1984), and bv PREALC.  The public
sector labor force has also been examined, for example Lindauer, Meesook and
Suebsaeng  (1938).  The present set of studies tries to cover a broad range of
countries, including some which had not been much studied previously.  Although
structural adjustment is by no means complete in these countries, there are by
now enough vears of data after the onset of crisis and adjustment that it may
be timUly to assess experience so  far.  As such the country studies may provide
a valuable basis for generalization.
II.  Varieties of Adiustment Experience
Before drawing conclusions on the role of labor markets in adjustment on
the basis  o'.  our  case  studies,  it is useful  to consider  the nature  of  the
adjustment that has  taken place  in these countries.  Although  it is hard  to
quantify the type or success of adjustment, we would venture to suggest that  our
12 countries fall into four groups of three.  One group consists of the three
Asian countr'.is  in the sample, which have by and large had short and successful
adjustments  (based on previously  relatively outward  oriented  economies).  A
second  group  consists  of  3  countries  which  had  previously  strongly  inward
oriented economies which undertook severe and painful adjustment (Ghana, Chile,
and  Bolivia).  The remaining countries  all  undertook less  severe  adjustments than
the second group, but with less immediate success than the Asian group.  These
6 countries form somewhat of a continuum, but three of them (Brazil, Costa Rica
and Kenya) had  moderate success  in adjusting without  requiring major  policy
reversals, and the last three (Argentina,  Cote d'Ivoire and Egypt) had somewhat
less success (in the case of Egypt as an oil exporter, efforts to adjust began
only very late in the time period under study).11
Tables 1 and 2 provide some summary information  on two key economic
variables,  namely  growth  rates  of COP (the  most frequently  used indicator  of
economic performance:  see table 1), and real effective exchange rate (one
possible  indicator  of relative  prices  key to the  adjustment  process:  see table
2).  As table  1 shows,  the  Asian  countries  have  had occasional  less  successful
years,  but in general  exhibit  growth  rates  of 5% per annum  or greater,  and  no
years  of negative  growth. Of the  "severe  adjustment"  countries,  Chile  and  Ghana
exhibit  economic  problems  datcag  back to the  1970's,  with large  negative  growth
of GDP in  some  years.  but since  1983  each  country  has  grown  at close  to or  more
than 5% in three  of the following  years.  Bolivia (the other country in the
group)  encountered  economic  problems  later  (bolstered  by hydrocarbon  exports  in
the  1970's),  and  experienced  the  longest  span  without  positive  growth  of all  the
sample  countries (between  1978 and 1986 there  was only one year of positive
growth).  Economic  recovery  there  remains  weak.  Costa  Rica,  Brazil  and Kenya
(characterized  here  as  "moderate adjustment" countries) appear to  resume
reasonable  growth  rates  of  GDP  after  the  worst  years  (around  1980-82),  although
their  year-to-year  growth  rates  following  adjustment  are  more  variable  than  the
Asian  countries. The  remaining  three  cases  (Argentina,  Cote  d'Ivoire  and  Egypt,
characterized  here as "less  successful  adjustment'  countries)  exhibit rather
heterogeneous  behavior. Argentina  has  continual  stop-and-go  cycles  dating  back
at least to 1974.  Cote d'Ivoire  encountered  problems in the 1980's after
successful  growth  in the  1970's,  but its  ability  to adjust  has  been limited  by
membership  of  the  West  African  monetary  union. Finally,  Egypt  as  an  oil  exporter
only  began  to experience  a growth  slowdown  after  1985.
As the time pattern of growth rates in table 1 show, the timing of
adjustment  was somewhat  different  in the  various  countries. Chart  1 shows  theTable 1:  Growth Rates of GDP (constant prices)
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sequence of events described in the country studies.  1978 and 1982 were
obviouslv  watershed  years  (corresponding  to  the  second  oil  price  shock  and  start
of the rise in real interest  rates  in one case,  and to the onset  of the debt
crisis  as signalled  by inability  to pay in Brazil  and Mexico in the other).
Some  of the  variation  depends  on  price collapses  in  different  commodity  markets
(coffee,  cocoa  and tin  affected  different  countries  in the  sample),  as  well as
good or bad harvests  and  weather,  particularly  for the  African  countries. At
least  three  countries  had  begun  adjustment  in the  mid  1970's  (Kenya,  Chile,  and
Brazil),  and  Argentina  had  also  made  some  efforts  in  this  direction. (Of  course,
countries  such  as  Korea  and  Brazil  had  made  structural  adjustments  earlier  still,
changing  their trade regimes).  After 1982 all the countries in the sample
undertook  some form  of stabilization  and/or  structural  adjustment.
It is  somewhat  difficult  to  quantify  adjustment  policy  efforts  or success.
The  real  effective  exchange  rate (REER)  may  provide  some  useful  information,  in
so far as structural  adjustment  attempts  to change relative  prices and the
exchange  rate is a key  price.  There  are  however  some  problems  in interpreting
these  data.  Firstly,  some  countries  may  experience  policy  outcomes  which  differ
from their intentions  (for example  Cote d'Ivoire recently  tried to mimic a
devaluation,  but  due to  changes  in  other  currencies  their  exchange  rate in  fact
appreciated). Secondly,  there  is  no benchmark  as to  what the  equilibrium  real
exchange  rate  should  be.  Some  countries  therefore  appear  to  have succeeded  in
deep  currency  depreciations,  but  from  previously  highly  distorted  rates,  whereas
others appear to have less success,  but because the previous rate was less
distorted.
Table  2  provides  some  information  on  REER's. Of the  3  countries  with least
success  in  adjustment,  2  also  failed  to  achieve  real  currency  depreciations  after13
1982  (Egypt's  currency  in  fact  appreciated  quite  sharply),  and  the  third  country
(Argentina)  did  not  sustain  depreciations.  Most  of  the  other  countries  for  which
there  are  data  achieved  some  depreciation  of their  currency:  Kenya  after  the  1981
devaluation  and reforms  (although  the  policy  may have begun to slip in 1986),
Bolivia  after  the  1985  policy  change,  Chile  after  the  1984  stabilization,  Costa
Rica after  the  major  structural  adjustment  efforts  in 1984,  Malaysia  after  the
onset  of the  1984  recession,  and  Ghana  after  the  economic  recovery  program  began
in  1983. With  this  background  on the  nature  of the  adjustment  experience  in  our
12 countries,  we turn now to labor  markets  and their  role in the adjustment
process.
III.  The  Role  of Labor  Markets  during  Adiustment
III.1  Unemployment  and  Real Wages
Tables  3 and  4 summarize  country  experience  as regards  unemployment  and
real  wage  trends  for  the  12  country  studies. Unemployment  series  are  available
for 9 of the countries  studied  (excluding  those in sub-Saharan  Africa).  Most
of the  countries  do  show  cyclical  or trend  increases  in  unemployment  related  to
periods  of recession  and stabilization  (see  chart  1 also).  Chile  exhibits  the
most  dramatic  unemployment  performance,  with  unemployment  levels  of over  10%  in
all  the  years  from  1976 (when  the  series  begins)  until  1987,  reaching  a peak  of
26% in 1982.  It is difficult  to understand  how the rate could  remain  so high
for  so long,  in the  absence  of unemployment  benefits.
Several  of the studies discuss the composition  of the unemployed,  and
generally  confirm the "luxury  unemployment"  hypothesis,  whereby those openly
unemployed  are  more frequently  secondary  household  workers  (i.e.  not household
heads)  and  are  often  the  more educated. Egypt  represents  an extreme  case  where
a  survey  of two  cities  found  that  90%  of the  unemployed  were  new  entrants  to theTable  3:  Unemployment  Rates
Year
Country  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  198&  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Argentina  - - - - 4.2  3.4  4.8  3.3  3.3  2.5  2.5  4.8  5.3  4.7  4 6  6.1  5.2  5.6  6  1
Bolivia  - - - - - - - - 7.5  6.2  7.5  8.2  6.6  5.7  4 2  5.9  11.5  10 7
Brazil  - - - - - - - - 6.8  6.4  6.3  7.9  6.3  6.7  7.1  5.3  3.6  3.8  - -
Chie  - - - - - 17.4  16.9  17.9  17.0  15.0  25.0  26 2  21.4  19.0  13.6  10.9  7.2
Costa Rica  - - - - - - 6.2  4.6  4.5  4.9  5.9  8.8  9.4  9.0  - 6.9  5.9  5.6  5 5
Cote  crivoire  - - - - - - - - - - 2.5  - - - 2.8  2.5  - -
Egypt  2.4  1.8  1.5  4.7  2.3  2.5  - 3.1  3.6  4.6  5.2  5.4  5.7  6.6  6.0  - - - 6 8
Ghana  - - - - -
Kenya  - - - - - - 6.1  - - - - - - - - 6.9  -
Korea  4.5  4.5  4.5  4.0  4.1  4.1  3.9  3.8  3.2  3.8  5.2  4.5  4.3  4.1  3.8  4.0  3.8  3.1  25
Malaysia  7.6  - - - 6.7  - - - 6.3  5.7  5.7  5.0  4.7  5.5  6.3  7.6  8.5  8.2  - -
Thailand  - - - - - 0.4  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.9  0.9  0.9  3.6  1.9  2.3  3.7  3.5  5.8  - -
Sources,
Data  are from  country  stucies  for Kenya,  Bolivia.  Chile  (INE data),  Costa  Rica.  and  Argentina,  and are from household  or labour  force  survey  data  as tar  as possible. Data  tor
Cote  divoire are from  the 1980  Census  and from  Fields  (1990).  Data  for Egypt  trom  CAPMAS  (Population  Census),  for  May  Chigh  agricultural  demand  survey. Data  for Brazil  are
from Riveros  (1989). Data  for Malaysia  for 1970's  are from  Wong  (1985),  and  for 1980's  from World  Bank Economic  Repons,  with the exception  of 1980  which is from 5th Malaysia  Plan  1986-90.  Data  tor Korea  are for manutacturing  only, and  are trom  Principal  Economic  Indicators Bank  of tforea. Data  for Thailand  are from  Statistical  Yearbook
lbailand 1976J80,81/84.  85J86,87/88  and 1989.Table  4:  Real  Wages  Indices  (1980=100)
Counry  1970  1971  1972  1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1i9f8
Argentna  108  112  105  115  129  124  8)  74  77  85  100  91  83  97  106  87  82  72 Bolivia  100  114  113  118  94  86  98  107  108  110  100  O  56...  42  36  56  34  42 Brazil  79  - - - - 84  85  89  94  95  100  109  122  113  105  113  122  106 Chie  110  - - - - 63  72  82  91  100  100  114  133  95  89  76  73  71 Costa Ficat  - - - - - - 80  9,  97  105  100  85  63  77  - 92  96  - - CostaRica9
- - - - - - - - - - 100  84  65  77  - 93  97 'Cote  dlvoire  - - - - - - - - - - 100  - - - - 115  - - - *Egyp
0
- - - 85  9Q  73  79  92  89  105  100  103  104  108  118  120  103  91 .Egyptd  9  3  96  as  8B  109  100  103  100  105  108  104  108  101  92  84 'Egypt  - - -125  109  104  105  104  103  103  100  108  109  98  95  89  75  69 *Ghana  - - - - - - - - 113  3  100  SD  53  41  OD  87  141  - -Kenyaa  - 88  as  89  87  90  91  100  9)  81  79  80  78  79  92  84 *Kenyab  - - - -106  103  114  109  110  106  100  96  85  84  81  78  83  83  81  L *Korea  44  45  46  53  57  SB  68  82  96  105  100  S9  106  115  122  130  139  150  168 *Malaysia  83  83  8D  71  76  OD  85  87  89  95  100  93  106  115  122  130  139  150  168
a  private sector  e  government
b  public sector  t  paid workers (employees)
c  private sector  9  all workers
d  public enterprises  . denotes possible break in series
Sources:
Data for Kenya, Ghana, Bolivia, Egypt, Chile, Costa Rica and Argentina are from country studies.  Indioes were recalculated to base of 1980 where necessary, by the overview authors.  Data for Brazil are from Riveros (1989).  Data for Malaysia for 1968874  are from Department  of Statistics, Industrial Surveys, and for  1975-87 from Depanment ot Statistics. Monthly Industrial Statstics, and refer only to manufacturing.  Data for Korea are from Bank of Korea Principal economic indicators,  and are for manufacturing only. Data for Cote dcvoire are from Lavy and Newman (1989) and are tor the formal sector only.
'denotes  data from employment and eamrings  survey (otherwise household survey).14
labor  force,  and  that  80%  had  intermediate  level  of  education  or  above. Educated
female unemployment  is a particular  problem in Egypt, since there are few
opportoinities  outside the government  sector.  In Thailand, unemployment is
highest amongst those  with vocational  education,  and education  of university
graduates rose  in  the  1980's, when  government employment growth slowed
dramatically. Likewise in Malaysia, the educated  unemployed  phenomenon  has
changed  over time,  from  unemployed  high school  graduates  to unemployed  college
graduates, and  as  in  Egypt,  there  is  more  cause  for  female educated
unemployment. The  Costa  Rica  and  Bolivia  studies  both  document  another  feature
of the  composition  of the  unemployed,  namely  an increase  in the  share  of head'
of households  and  of job leavers  amongst  the  atnemployed  in  crisis  years.
In most of the countries,  weak labor  demand  translated  into other forms
than unemployment.  Underemployment increased, although this  is  hard  to
measure (the  Costa  Rica,  Bolivia  and  Argentina  studies  provide  data  and  show  that
it generally  moved with the unemployment  rate).  Participation  rates also
changed,  and informalization  increased. Only Chile and Bolivia used formal
emergency employment  programs,  but many of the countries bolstered public
employment  at least as a temporary  measure during the crisis,  until fiscal
stabilization  measures  dictated  public  sector  employment  cuts.  Discussion  of
public  employment  is  delayed  until  section  III.4  below.
Changes  in  participation  rates  can  affect  the  measurement  of  unemployment.
Theory  is however  ambiguous  as to  whether  the  added  or the  discouraged  worker
effect  will predominate. Three  of the studies  discuss  the issue,  and suggest
that  the added  worker  effect  predominated  in Costa  Rica during  the crisis  and
discouraged  worker  effect  in  Bolivia. In  Argentina  the  authors  argue  that the
discouraged  worker  effect  prevailed  in  the 1970's,  and  the  added  worker  effect15
in the  1980's,  although  they  do not  provide  an explanation  for  the  change. One
complica3ion  in inzerpreting  the  data is  that  most  countries  have also  observed
a  trend increase in female labor force participation  rates (the Malaysia,
Bolivia,  Costa  Rica,  Korea  and  Kenya  studies  all  mention  this). Thus it is  not
alwavs  easy to separate  trends  in female  labor  force  participation  over time,
from temporary  fluctuations  in response  to  economic  crisis.
A  final form of quantity  adjustment  involved  a  shift from formal to
informal  sector  employment. As employees  lost  jobs,  one route to take  was to
become  self-employed  in the  absence  of  unemployment  compensation,  and likewise
output and thus employment  often shifted from large formal sector  firms to
smaller  informal  sector  ones.  This is again a difficult  topic  on which to
obtain  data, and studies  often define  the informal  sector  differently. The
phenomenon  has  been  widely  studied  for  Latin  America  by Tokman  and  others. The
Bolivia  case  study  argues  informalization  was  an  important  method  of  labor  market
adjustment. In Argentina  although  the authors  state  that the informal  sector
was less important  than elsewhere  in Latin  America,  non-wage  employment  grew
faster  than  wage employment  in non-tradeables  in all three  periods  considered
(1960's,  1970's  and  1980's),  and in  both  manufacturing  and  agriculture  non-wage
employment  grew  faster  in  2  of  the  3  periods. In  Brazil  the  main  shift  was into
the unprotected  employee  sector  (those  without  signed  contracts),  rather  than
into  self  employment.
Informalization  has  been  less  well  documented  in  Africa. The  Cote  d'Ivoire
study  however  does mention  a shift  between  formal  and informal  establishments
in  manufacturing,  and  a similar  employment  shift  is  argued  to  have occurred  in
Kenya  (where  the  informal  sector  employment  grew  11%  in  1988  when  wage  employment
growth  slowed). T'nere  is  also  similar  evidence  for  Asia.  In  Malaysia  the  trend16
rise in employees  as a proportion  of the labor  force  was reversed  during  the
short  recession. In Korea the trend  towards  an increased  employment  share in
large  firms  in  manufacturing  was  arrested  in  the  early  1980's,  and the  proportion
of females  who were regular employees (as opposed to temporary or casual)
likewise  reversed  its  upward  trend.
Real  wage  behavior,  perhaps  more than  unemployment  rates,  differentiates
the  country  groups  discussed  in  section  I.  (Note  that  the  wage data available
are  for  the  formal  sector  except  for  the  Latin  countries). The  Asian  countries
show a fairly  steady  advance in real wages,  with brief interruptions  during
recession (although the authors stress the importance  of these real wage
slowdowns  in  allowing  productivity  to  stay  ahead  of  real  wage  growth  and  ensuring
declining  unit costs).  The "severe  adjustment"  countries  show dramatic  wage
fluctuations,  with  wages  at  their  lowest  less  than  50%  of  the  peak,  and  with  real
wage declines  far  greater  than  the  fall in  GDP.  Real  wages in  Ghana recovered
by 1986,  are  still  not  back to  peak levels  in  Chile,  and  are  continuing  to fall
in Bolivia.  The other countries  are somewhat intermediate:  in 2 of the 3
"moderate  adjustment"  countries  (Costa  Rica  and  Brazil)  there  are gains  between
the start and end of the time series,  albeit  less marked than for the  Asian
countries,  and the third (Kenya)  has a wage decline in the public  sector  but
private  wages  are  closer  to  holding  their  own. The  difference  between  Kenya  and
the  other  ccuntries  in this  group  is  likely  population  pressure.  Finally,  the
"less  successful  adjustment"  countries  show  a less  severe  wage  decline  than  the
"severe  adjustment"  ones,  perhaps  explaining  a  little  of  the  political  opposition
to  such  severe  adjustments. It is  however  necessary  to  be a little  cautious  in
interpreting  the real wage data, particularly  in cases  where it is not from
household-survey  data,  because  of the employment  composition  issue.  Earnings17
functions  (discussed  later)  can  be helpful  in  this regard.
How can  we interpret  the  evidence  discussed  above,  and  what can we infer
about labor market  workings?  As discussed  in section I.1, there are three
possible  explanations  as to  why  unemployment  may  persist  during  stabilization.
The first  of these  is  that  the  labor  market  is  not  working  well  because  of real
wage rigidity. The evidence  of our case studies  certainly  does not favor  the
view that real wages  were rigid  and therefore  led to unemployment. Even for
Chile,  where  unemployment  was  highest  and  persisted  the  longest,  real  wages  fell
dramatically.  Even  in  economies  like  Brazil  and  Argentina,  where  wage  indexation
is  prevalent,  real  wages  have  been flexible. Devereux  argues  that the  failure
of disinflation  plans  in these  countries  is due  more to inappropriate  and non-
credible  fiscal  policies. The  effect  of  wage indexation  is only  to  magnify  and
lengthen  the  inflation  response. If the  "inflexible"  real  wage explanation  is
inappropriate,  because of the observed  severe  falls in real wages, then this
leaves  the  other  two  explanations--aggregate  demand  feedbacks  from  declining  real
wages,  and  output  market  imperfections.
The wage level  enters  the system  as a determinant  of aggregate  demand
through its effect on  the distribution  of  income.  The mechanism depends
crucially  on the assumption  (generally  valid empirically)  that the  propensity
to save is  markedly  lower  for  wage earners  than  for  recipients  of profits.  If
the share  of wage in total income  falls,  for example,  savings in the economy
increase,  and  aggregate  demand  will  fall  unless  there  is  an offsetting  increase
in  investment. These  ideas  are implicit  in  the  works  of  Keynes  and  Kalecki  and
have recently  been discussed  in the context  of stabilization  and adjustment
problems  of developing  countries  by Taylor  (1988)  among  others.
Taylor  distinguishes between what  he  calls  "exhilarationist"  and18
"stagnationist"  economic  scenarios.  In  the  former,  output  is  constrained  by
bottlenecks  related  to  a short  supply  of  capital.  Real  wage  cuts  leading  to  a
higher  profit  share  will  increase  the  supply  of  savings,  and  may  translate  into
higher  investment. In the "stagnationist"  economic  scenario,  however,  the
binding  constraint  on  output  growth  is  the  low  level  of  consumer  demand  relative
to capacity. A fall in the  share  of wages in these  conditions  leads  to
stagnation.  It is  possible  for  an economy  to start  from  an  exhilarationist
position,  but then  slip  into  a stagnationist  position  as wage share  falls
steeply.
The  existence  of  a  dual  labor  market  with  a  distinctly  'Lower  wage  level
in  one  sector  compared  to  the  other,  reinforces  ttie  conclusions  drawn  from  the
model  with  a  homogeneous  labor  market. Consider  the  case  of  a recession  with
a  fall  in  labor  demand  in  the  formal  sector.  Although  the  typical  scenario  as
analyzed  in the  country  studies  is  that  there  is  a fall  in  wages,  sometimes
fairly  drastic,  this  is  not  always  the  case. In  Malaysia  average  earnings  of
workers  in  the  formal  sector  actually  increased  because  workers  of  short  periods
of  service  and  workers  at  the  lower  spectrum  of  wages  and  skills  were  laid  off
first. In  all  cases,  however,  the  workers  displaced  from  the  formal  sector  as
well  as  those  entering  the  labor  force  entered  the  informal  sector  in  growing
numbers. The  share  of total  employment  at the  lower  wage  levels  increased
significantly.  For  the  economy  as  a  whole,  therefore,  average  wages  fell  faster
and  to  a  greater  extent  than  in  the  formal  sector.
Does the stagnatLonist  hypothesis  still hold if we allow for the
possibility  of  exports?  In  the  traditional  model  of  the  small  open  economy  (such
as  the  one  which  is  reviewed  by  Addison  and  Demery)  it  will  not  hold  unless  wages
are rigid  downward  in  both  the  tradeable  and  the  non-tradeable  sectors. As19
demand  contracts,  and there  is  wage-rigidity  in the  non-tradeable  sector,  there
will  be  unemplovment  in this  sector. But  if  wages  are  flexible  in  the  tradeable
sector,  costs  will fall  in tradeables.  There  is,  however,  unlimited  demand  for
tradeables  at the going  product  price,  under the  assumption  of a small  open
economy model, so that the unemployed  labor will be absorbed in the more
profitable  tradeable  sector. Total  demand  will  be restored  to its  initial  level
with a larger  share  of GDP accounted  for  by tradeables. But even if there  are
wage  rigidities  in  both  sectors,  the  profitability  of  the  tradeable  sector  needed
to  attract  resources  with it,  can  still  be achieved  by a real  devaluation  which
increases  the ratio  of prices  of tradeables  to that  of non-tradeables  (PT/PN)-
This is  why in the  textbooks  devaluation  is  sometimes  called  an alternative  to
wage flexibility.
The  Asian and Latin  American  country  studies  provide  sharp  contrasts  as
to the role of wages  and devaluation  in  macro  demand  contraction. Korea,  for
example,  depended  on continuous  devaluation  of its  currency  over a long  period
of time as well as maxi-devaluationz  during  periods  of severe  external  shock.
As an export-oriented  economy it was necessary for Korea to increase its
competitiveness  by reducing  its  unit labor  costs in dollar  terms. (see  table
III.1  of the  Korea  study). Due to the  rapid  growth  of labor  productivity,  the
response  to  external  shocks  was  to  hold  constant  real  wages  rather  than  requiring
a  wage  decline.  The  combination  of  a  maxi-devaluation  and  temporarily  preventing
wages from rising  with productivity,  led to a very quick  recovery  of exports.
At the  same  time,  since  the  slowdown  in  real  wage  growth  was  so short,  there  was
no significant  deflationary  impact  in the  domestic  market.
Another  factor  important  in recovery  was government  policies  to counter
the  increase  in  non-wage  costs  following  devaluation. Because  of its  important20
role in the  finance  of large-scale  industry,  the  government  was able to offset
to some extent  the increase  in the  co-t of borrowed  foreign  capital  caused  by
de.aluation  by offering  cheap  subsidized  credit  to  business.
The  last point touches on a  general point about the role of wage
flexibility  in adjustment. In Southeast  Asian  economies  the  share  of  wages in
value  added  is typically  one-third  or a little  more.  Thus,  changes  in capital
costs  are  often  as important  in  determining  competitiveness  as changes  in  wage
levels.  The course  of events  leading  up to the recession  in Malaysia  in the
middle  80s,  and the  subsequent  adjustments  triggering  recovery,  illustrate  the
point  vividly. Unlike  Korea,  Malaysia  is an oil exporter. In the early  80s,
government  spending in Malaysia increased  enormously,  partly to bolster an
attempt  to  prolong  the  boom  associated  with  the  oil  boom. The  resultant  pressure
on external  competitiveness  came  from  three  sources: (i)  there  was  an increase
in wages which continued  even after employment  growth  had slowed  down; (ii)
there  was  a  sharp  increase  in  interest  rates  as demand  for  private  capital  funds
competed  with the  public  demand;  and  (iii)  there  was  an  appreciation  of the  real
exchange  rate,  because the  capital  account  was uncontrolled,  ar:d  there  was a
massive inflow of  capital to  finance the budget deficit.  The  loss of
competitiveness  created an external  imbalance  which could only be corrected
through a sharp recession.  Malaysia  was fortunate,  however, that all the
relevant  factors  showed  remarkable  flexibility.  As  wages  fell,  the  interest  rate
fell  to  a  level  which  was  nearly  a third  of its  peak  level,  and  there  was  a  sharp
depreciation  of the  currency. It  is  clear  that  it  was the  "collapse'  of  all  the
factor  markets  which  was instrumental  in  making  the  recession  short-lived. Of
course, the improvement  in the world economy was a factor triggering  the
recovery,  but it  was  the  gain  in  competitiveness  fed  by the  downward  flexibility21
wages, interest  rates  and exchange  rates  which allowed  Malaysia  to seize the
opportunitv  in the  second  half of the  80_.
Te  Latin studies illustrate  almost the opposite  case in terms of the
effects  of real wages on demand,  the clearest  example  being that of Bolivia.
The fall  in wages in the  1980s  was twice  that  of the  magnitude  of fall in real
GDP, and if we take into  account  the increased  share  of the  low  wage informal
sector,  the  fall in the  share  of labor  income  must  have been drastic. Even  by
the end of the decade there was little sign of any recovery of wages or
employment.  The fall in the share  of wages must have depressed  the  domestic
market considerably.  At the same time, in spite of the real exchange  rate
falling to less than a  third of the level of 1985, there was no sign of
export-led  recovery. Evidently  the  market  structure  for favoring  large  shifts
to  export  did not  exist  in Bolivia.
By contrast, another Latin American country, Costa Rica, shows the
possibilities  of  the  existence  of  a  basic  structure  of  links  to  the  world  market,
and  also  illustrates  the  advantages  of an institutional  mechanism  which limits
the  direction  of wage deflation. Real  wages  fell  between  1980-2  as indexation
tied  to past infl.ation  failed  to  protect  workers  as inflation  accelerated. In
mid-1982,  when  stabilization  was  instituted,  real  wages  turned  upwards  again  as
inflation  decelerated. By 1986,  real  wages  had regained  their  value of 1980.
The short  period  within  which the real wage decline  was confined  might have
helped  to  stabilize  the  domestic  aggregate  demand. At the  same  time  the  decline
in the product  price of exportables  i.elped  by the fall in real wage and the
devaluation  of  1980  was  instrumental  in  the  improvement  of  the  export  situation.
Established  institutions  thus  helped  Costa  Rica in two  ways  to stage  a recovery
in the  post-1982  period. Market  links  were important  in ensuring  that  the  fall22
in  real  exchange  rates  and  wage  costs  had  the  desirable  impact  on exports. More
surprisinglv,  indexation  was  significant  in  the  initial  fall  in real  wages,  and
in limiting  the  period  of wage stagnation.
Another  instance  of sharp  deflation  caused  by  a fall  in  the  share  of  wages
in  GDP  comes  from  the  case  of  Chile  during  the  drastic  policies  of stabilization
pushed  through  by the  military  junta  after  the  fall  of the  Allende  regime. This
case illustrates  the  importance  of  product  markets  in  the  process  of  adjustment.
Although  extreme,  it  is  worthy  of  discussion  because,  as  Ramos  points  out,  "other
countries  may simply  be experiencing  in slow motion (stagflation)  what Chile
experienced  all  at once (hyperstagflation)."
In October  1973,  the junta  freed  prices  wnich  had been controlled  under
the  previous  socialist  regimes,  but  unlike  Germany  after  World  War  II,  Chile  did
not  have  a  monetary  reform  to  put  a  cap  on the  freed  inflationary  prices. Prices
immediately  rose  to levels  30 times  those  of 1979,  and  clearly  overshooting  by
a good deal  what  had  been expected  to  be the  equilibrium  level.
On the  labor  front,  the  junta's  policy  was  to separate  wage  readjustments
from  the  freezing  of  prices  in  order  to  prevent  a  wage-price  spiral. Adjustment
of wages was postponed  by several  months.  When it did take place, it was
consistent  with a much lower  rate  of inflation. Thus, there  was a sharp  drop
in  real  wages  which  in  1975  was  nearly  half  its  pre-Allende  level. The  real  wage
decline  astonishingly  was  accompanied  not  only  by high rates  of inflation,  but
also  by a rapidly  increasing  rate  of unemployment  which  climbed  from 3  percent
in  the  first  half  of 1973  to 10  percent  in  1974  and  19  percent  in  the  first  half
of 1976.  The rise in unemployment  was, as is to  be expected,  associated  with
a sharp  decline  in  industrial  output  at least  until  the  end  of  1975.  (The  index
of industrial  output  declined  by  half between  end-1973  and  end-1975).23
That explains  the  co-existence  of high inflation  rate,  falling  real  wage,
and  declining  output? The  crux  of the  problem  would  seem to  be the  inflationary
exnectations  and non-competitive  behavior in the product  market.  There was
clearly  no  demand  pressure  because  consumer  demand  fell  very  early  with the  fall
in real wage, and demand contraction  intensified  as  real wages  fell and
unemployment  increased  at a high rate.  Nor was there  any cost pressure;  for
"whereas  the  prices  of imported  inputs  in the  last quarter  of 1973 rose to 30
times  and  wages  rose  14  times  their  1969  levels,  product  prices  rose to  40 times
their 1969 levels  upon being freed in October 1973."  Prices  seem to have
increased  in  anticination  of much  higher  demand  and  cost  pressures  than in  fact
existed.  "Producers  seem to have set prices  to balance  supply  and demand  not
as of the moment, but in three months' time so to speak."  The anticipated
increase  could  be on the side  of money  demand,  or in terms  of unforeseen  wage
adjustments,  devaluation  and  rise in input  costs.
The continuation  of inflationary  price increase  in the face of serious
diseouilibrium  in  the  product  market  with  producers  unable  to  sell  their  products
is  a  difficult  proposition  to  explain  in  terms  of  textbook  economics,  and  indeed
came  as a surprise  to  policy  makers. A  major  factor  in  the  continuation  of the
process  was  that  price  setters  were  not  penalized  soon  enough  for  their  erroneous
expectations  because  of the  massive  increase  in the  share  of profits  which  the
fall in real  wage entailed.
The  inflationary expectation  was  finally broken when  there  was  a
revaluation  of  the  currency  for  balance  of  payments  reasons  and  tariff  reductions
undertaken  for  reasons  connected  with the  long-run  development  of the  economy.
The downward  jolt these  measures  gave to the  prices  of both inputs  and final
goods  seems  to  have  fueled  the  recovery  after  1976. Prices  finally  began  growing24
less than  the  money  supply,  with output  rising,  unemployment  falling,  and  real
wage rising  much more than  total  output.
III.2  Proolems  of Distributive  Conflicts
The fact that there is enough  evidence  to suggest  that wages  have been
flexible  in  many  countries  during  the  periods  of adjustment  does  not imply  that
issues  of  distributive  conflicts  have  not  been  major  issues  in  several  countries.
The country studies show that in Latin  America, in particular,  the conflict
between  maintaining  or increasing  labor's  share  of  output  and  achieving  external
balance  has been an important  factor  in the limited  success  of stabilization
policies.  Countries,  of course, differ in the importance  of distributive
conflict  in their economic  history.  Apart from differences  in labor  market
institutions,  discussed  below in Section  III.3,  the structure  of the economy
seems  to  be critical  in some  cases.
One factor  which seems  to be important  is whether  food is an important
tradeable  or not.  The case of Argentina is a good example  showing  how the
different  objectives  could be in conflict  when basic foods in the workers'
consumption  budget  (cereals,  meats,  etc.)  are  tradeable  goods,  and there  is  no
significant government interference with  the  domestic prices  of  these
commodities. In this  case there  is a close  relationship  between the  exchange
rate  and  the  product  wage in the  non-tradeable  sector  of the  economy. Currency
devaluations  lead  to  increases  in  the  domestic  price  of  food,  which  in  turn  leads
to upward  pressure  on money  wages.  Such an increase  will not affect  product
wages in the tradeable  sector,  since  ;roduct  prices  of traded  goods  would  also
have increased  in the  domestic  market.  But  ceteris  paribus, the  product  wage
in  the  nontradeable  sector  will increase.  There  is  then  a  conflict  of interests
between  the  producers  of  non-tradeables  and  the  workers  employed  in  this  sector.25
This exchange rate-wage trade off taken together  with the fact that
politicallv  the non-tradeable  sector is more powerful  because of its urban
location,  has  given  rise  to  the  wage  cycle  documented  in  the  country  study. When
external  markets  of  Argentina's  food  exports  are  strong,  the  tendency  is  for  the
currency  to slide into  overvaluation  which helps increase  real wages without
hurting  profitability  in  the  urban  non-tradeable  sector. But,  when  the  external
terms  of trade  weaken,  devaluation  is  imperative  to  ease  the  problem  of external
imbalance,  and various forces  are set in motion  which depress  real wages to
protect  profitability. In Argentina,  as in much of Latin  America,  bursts  of
inflation  have  often  been the  mechanism  for  reducing  real  wages.
It  should  be  noted  that  not  all  countries  have  a large  proportion  of their
wage-goods  or  food  as  tradeables  as  Argentina  does. In  particular,  in  many  Asian
economies  (including  the  two in  our  sample,  Korea  and  Malaysia)  rice,  although
an internationally  traded  good,  is  in  fact  a  non-tradeable  because  of government
price  policies.  In these  countries,  the government  plays a dual role in the
price market.  On the one hand, it buys rice from the farmers at a high
procurement  price  as an aid to support  the level  of earnings  in this sector.
On the other hand, it distributes  the rice through its retail outlet at a
subsidized  price for the benefit  of (mainly)  urban consumers.  The financial
deficit  caused  by the  difference  between  the  buying  and selling  price  of rice
is  covered  by the  overall  budget  of the  central  government. Thus,  although  the
government  imports  rice to supplement  the amount  procured  from local  farmers,
the  domestic  price  of rice is insulated  from the  border  price.  This important
wage good  is,  in  effect,  a  non-tradeable.  The  problem  analyzed  above,  stemming
from  an inverse  relationship  between  the  external  value  of the  currency  and  the
price  of the  wage good,  does  not  exist  for  such  economies.26
The supply  of capital  may  also lead  to a trade-off  between  wages  and the
exchange  rate.  Let us assume  that  the growth  of output  is constrained  by the
supply of capital (savings)  rather than by demand (i.e. in terms of the
distinction  made in  section  III.1  the  economic  scenario  is an "exhilarationist"
one.)  The share  of wages in  value  added  has a direct  effect  on total  savings
and  hence the  growth  rate  of output. The  exchange  rate  also affects  the  output
growth  from  two  angles: first,  the  higher  the  value  of the  currency  the  greater
the trade deficit which--if it can be sustained--increases  foreign savings
(borrowing)  in the  economy.  Secondly,  a higher  value of the currency  reduces
the  cost  of intermediate  inputs,  and  effectively  increases  the  marginal  impact
of savings  on output  growth.
An exchange-rate/wage  trade-off  exists  in the  sense  that  a given  rate  of
savings  (and  growth  rate)  could  be achieved  with different  pairs  of values  of
the  exchange  rate  and the  wage share;  the  higher  the latter,  the  higher  has to
be the  degree  of overvaluation.  Government  policy  impacts  on  both the  exchange
rate  and  the  wage  share  through  its  determination  of  the  rate  of  growth  of  money
supply,  and  hence  the  rate  of  inflation.  With  indexation  rules  determining  both
exchange  rate  and  wage  adjustments,  because  of lags  in  the  system,  a  higher  rate
of inflation  achieves  both  a higher  rate  of overvaluation  and a lower  share  of
wages.  There is then an equilibrium  relationship  connecting  the rate of
inflation,  the  value  of the  exchange  rate,  the  wage share,  and  the real  growth
rate  of the  economy.
The case of Brazil  illustrates  the  key problems  and constraints  in this
system. During  the  period  1967-83,  Brazil  followed  a  policy  of stepping  up the
growth  rate  by expanding  the  supply  of money.  This led to a rise in the rate
of inflation,  and fall in the  share  of  wages.  The associated  increase  in real27
exchange  rate and the fall in the share  of wages  both increased  real output
growth  by increasing  foreign  and  domestic  savings  and  reducing  the  domestic  cost
of imported  inputs. The  mechanism  for  bringing  about  this  change  worked  as long
as changes in the values of the relevant  variables were sustainable.  The
feasibility  of a fall in the share  of wages depended  on the existence  of an
authoritarian  political  system. Similarly,  the  appreciation  of  the  real  exchange
rate  meant  an increase  in trade  deficit  which  could  only  be financed  by foreign
borrowing. The  persistent  increase  in  foreign  debt  was  one  of the  costs  of this
strategy  of boosting  the  real rate  of growth.
The first oil shock of the mid 70s meant, in effect,  a change in the
parameter  of the  Brazilian  productlon  function,  so  that  at the  old  values  of the
variables,  output  growth  was depressed.  At the same time there  was a sharp
increase  in the import  bill.  The government's  response  to this situation  was
to  undertake  a  program  of import  substitution  in  capital  and  intermediate  goods,
fitianced  by stepped  up foreign  borrowing. The second  oil  shock  and  the  increase
in interest  rates  finally  made this  policy  unsustainable. The debt  burden  had
reached  a proportion  when further  foreign  borrowing  was no longer  an option  to
sustain  a  high  value  of the  real  exchange  rate. A new  element  in the  situation
was the change  in the  political  system.  It was no longer  easy to reduce  the
share  of  wages  with  a  higher  rate  of inflation.  The  country  study  discusses  the
distributional  conflicts  in more  detail.
Thus there  were two  barriers  to achieving  a higher  real savings  rate to
counteract  the  effect  of the  deterioration  of the  external  terms  of trade. The
government  could  not  continue  to  overvalue  the  exchange  rate,  nor  depress  wages.
Nor could  these  be changed  with a higher  rate  of inflation  in such  a way that
a new equilibrium  set of values  of the relevant  variables  could  be achieved.28
This was at the  heart of the  storv  of failure  of stabilization  efforts  in the
SOs. Cne :v out  o:unu1d  ha.e  been if  total  factor  productivity  growth  could  have
been incteased  to  a  sufficient  degree. But,  evidently  the  Brazilian  economy  was
not able to achieved  this goal.  On the contrary,  there is evidence  in the
country  studv that labor  productivity  actually  fell,  as labor  hoarding  in the
formal  tradeable  sector  increased  significantly  in  response  to  the  deteriorating
emplovment  situation. The  contrast  with  the  Korean  experience  on this  point  is
striking. The country  side documents  the enormous  importance  of total  factor
productivity  growth  in the  successful  adjustment  of the  Ko.'rean  economy  to the
oil  price shocks.  Because  of the increase  in total factor  productivity,  the
required  decline  in the share  of wages could  be achieved  with the  negligible
decrease  in the absolute  level  of real wages,  and the increase  in the  cost of
imported  inputs  due  to devaluation  could  be largely  offset.
The discussion  so far in Section  III has concentrated  on economy-wide
effects  of wage behavior.  In the next subsection  we turn to the effects of
variations  in  sectoral  wage differences  in the  process  of adjustment.
III.3  Sectoral  Emoloyment  Shifts  and  Relative  Wages
Sectoral  employment  shifts  are a key part of structural  adjustment,  and
Edwards  and Edwards  discuss  these  in a basic  2-sector  dependent-economy  model,
in the presence of labor market distortions.  They examine four different
scenarios (plus the basic competitive  case).  In the basic model, standard
results  apply  and labor  would  tend to  benefit  from  trade  liberalization.  Even
if economy  wide wage rigidity is allowed for, the authors  argue that trade
liberalization  reform  will  result  in  unemployment  in  the  short  run,  where  capital
is immobile.  However in the longer  run, if importables  are the less labor29
intensive  sector,  starting  from  an initial  condition  of unemployment,  a trade
liberalization  reForm  will increase  total  emplovment  in the  economy.
The  authors  then  take  the  case  where  only  the  importable  sector  is  covered
by a  minimum wage.  In  the short run there will be  lower employment in
importables  and higher employment in exportables,  but employment in non-
tradeables  and total  employment  is  ambiguous. They  conclude:  "in  the  presence
of labor  market  distortions,  trade liberalization  policies  usually  considered
to be beneficial  may generate  nontrivial  (short  run) unemployment  problems."
This  conclusion  holds also in the third  variant  considered,  that of capital
account  liberalization.
The  fourth and  final case considered is where wage distortions in
importables  are  related  to  degree  of  tariff  protection. In  the  short  run,  trade
liberalization  increases  unemployment  and depresses  wages  in the  other  sectors
in the economy.  Although  some of this  would disappear  in the long run, the
scenario  highlights  possible  political  economy  conflicts. Labor,  "the factor
of  production  that  is  supposed  to gain  from  freer  trade,  is  negatively  affect-ed
in the  short  run, and  the  long  run  gains  are  hard to  perceive  when compared  to
the initially  distorted  situation  of the  economy."
The  country  studies here  provide  information on  various  sectoral
differentials:  economic  sectors  (agriculture/manufacturing/construction  etc.),
formal/informal,  tradeable/non-tradeable,  and  occasionally  even  finer  categories
such  as importable/exportable/non-tradeable.  There  is  also  some  information  on
skill  differentials. How  formal/informal  or skilled/unskilled  categorizations
correspond  to the  tradeable/non-tradeable  distinction  which  is  of  key interest,
is not always clearly specified  in the country  studies,  and varies between
countries  (the  Brazil  study  provides  the  most  complete  breakdown).  One  important30
problem  in many of the studies  is that  the agriculture  sector  is an important
component  of tradeables,  but there  are  no agricultural  wage data for  the  Latin
countries.  and  thev  exist  for  the  African  countries  only for  one  point  in time.
All  of  the  studies  with  the  exception  of  Thailand,  Korea,  and  Brazil  provide
information  on sectoral  employment  shifts  in response  to structural  adjustment.
In most cases  different  industrial  sectors  are discussed,  but for two of the
Latin  countries  the  tradeables/non-tradeables  distinction  is  used instead. The
Asian  countries  were  relatively  successful  in  increasing  manufacturing  employment
during structural  adjustment.  In Latin America and Africa by contrast  the
picture  is that there  has been some  of the  desired  shift  into  tradeables,  but
largely  due  to  the  shift  back into  agriculture  and  out  of government  employment.
Manufacturing  sector  employment  frequentl;  seems  to have suffered  during the
years of crisis  and not to have recovered  during  adjustment. This is perhaps
not  a  surprising  result  of  policy  changes  which  depreciate  the  exchange  rate  but
at the same time reduce tariffs. Although  the former  benefits  agricultural
exports, the  possible benefits  to manufactures are  offset by  decreased
protection.
Thus in Cote d'Ivoire  there  has  been a shift  back into  agriculture  (based
on  panel  data,  and  examining  transition  behavior  and  the  destination  of new  job
entrants). Earnings  survey  data  over  time  document  the  large  decrease  in  modern
manufacturing  employment  despite  subsidies. In  Ghana  there  has  been  a reversal
of migration  into the capital,  Accra, (which  was the  destination  of 46.5% of
migrants  prior to 1970),  and instead  in 1982-7  Accra  was the source  of 60% of
recent  migrants. In  Kenya  sectoral  employment  figures  for  urban  areas  show  that
the  manufacturing  share  stagnated  since  1978.  In Egypt  the recession  led  to a
large  drop in the  manufacturing  sector,  especially  small  scale,  but the  author31
is skeptical  as to the possibility  of reverse  migration to rural  areas being
possible (the agriculture sector there in any case suffers from serious
disincentives,  wi,h  the exception of the more capital intensive livestock
sector). In  Bolivia  there  was  a net  shift  into  tradeables,  due  entirely  by the
shift  of  employment  back  into  agriculture,  Employment  in  manufacturing  declined.
In the  richer countries where urban households have a  more  tenuous
attachment  to rural  areas  it  seems  harder  to  envisage  return  migration  to rural
areas,  but it  may  be possible  for  agriculture  to attract  a larger  share  of new
job  entrants. Whereas  in  the  growth  years  of the  1970's  both  food  and  cash  crop
agric9  '  e lost employment  in Malaysia,  in the 1980's  recession  agriculture
proviaod  a tbhrd  of  new  jobs,  and  along  with  private  services  filled  the  gap  left
by slower  growth in manufacturing  and government  employment.  In Chile also
during  the  1980's  export  boom,  employment  in  agriculture  grew as fast  as total
employment.  Employment  in manufacturing  and mining grew even faster, thus
implying  a net shift  into  tradeables.
The  Argentina  and  Costa  Rica  studies  both  examine  employment  shifts  between
tradeable  and  non-tradeable  sectors. In  Argentina  there  has  been  a  secular  trend
towards  increased  employment  in  non-tradeables  and  in  Costa  Rica  a  similar  trend
out  of  exportables. Since  Argentina  did  not  have  a  sustained  adjustment  program
this  trend  continuea  in the  1980's,  but ,n Costa  Rica adjustment  arrested  (but
did not reverse)  the trend.  However the study authors find some cause for
optimism  in the  growth  of the  (small)  non-traditional  export  sector.
It is useful  to examine  sectoral  wage data in conjunction  with sectoral
employment  figures.  Simple theory suggests that the effect of structural
adjustment  policies  should  lead  to a relative  increase  in wages in tradeables
to encourage  labor  movement. However  employment  shifts  may  also  cause  changes32
in  relative  wages.  Structural  adjustment  in practice  has been  associated  with
labor  shedding  from  government  and  from  formal  sector  activities  (either  due  to
reduced  tariff  protection,  or the  removal  of  job security  legislation). Since
workers  cannot  remain  unemployed  long in developing  countries  due to lack of
unemployment  insurance,  there  has  been a tendency  for  labor  to  move to sectors
with flexible  entry,  frequently  the  informal  sector  or agriculture. "Crowding"
of  labor  in  these  sectors  may  have  also  depressed  relative  wages. Thus  relative
wages  in  non-tradeable  sectors  with  easy  entry  (e.g.  commerce,  services)  may  have
been depressed  both  directly  due  to  exchange  rate  changes  and indirectly  due  to
labor  crowding,  whilst  wages  in  tradeable  secr.cs  with  easy  entry
(e.g.  agriculture)  could go in either direction due  to opposing effects.
Furthermore  changes in labor force composition  within sectors can obscure
trends. Sectors  losing  labor  may experience  increases  in aggregate  wages  due
to the loss of workers  with the lowest  levels  of human  capital  and seniority.
The latter  effect  can  be dealt  with  by the  use  of earnings  functions,  discussed
at the  end  of this  section.
All  the  studies  (except  Thailand  and  Cote  d'Ivoire)  provide  some  information
on  the  changes  in  relative wages,  whether  between  economic  sectors,
formal/informal  sector,  tradeable/non-tradeable,  or skill  categories. Nine of
the  studies  have  information  on  sectoral  wages  over  time,  either  by  GNP  sectoral
classes  (4  studies)  or a  modified  version  thereof  (3  studies),  and  2  exaaine  the
tradeable/non-tradeable  distinction.  In general relative  wage changes did
support  structural  adjustment  objectives,  although  this  is  not  necessarily  true
for  each  country  and  each sector.
In  Ghana,  relative  wages  rose  in  agriculture  and  mining,  sectors  figuring
heavily in the Economic  Recovery  Program.  In Egypt  wages rose relatively  in33
agriculture  and  private  manufacturing,  largely  because  other  sectors  were  unable
to adjust employment.  In Kenya the relative  wage changes are not clearly
interpretable. Finally,  in Bolivia  relative  wages fell  in commerce  (crowding)
and manufacturing  (tariff  cuts),  and there  are no data for agriculture  which
expanded.
We next  consider  the  three  countries  where  modified  sectoral  wage  data  are
available. In these  three  countries,  manufacturing  wages  seemed  to rise  in  the
recession and/or  during structural adjustment, assisting the  growth  in
manufacturing  employment.  In  Chile,  manufacturing  wages  rose  relative  to  average
wages during  the structural  adjustment  export  boom in the 80's.  In Malaysia
during the boom up to 1984 agricultural  wages overall  gained,  but this was
reversed  during  the  recession. In  the  recession  manufacturing  and  construction
wages  tended  to increase  (possibly  due  to  shedding  of lower  paid  labor  with  less
human capital)  and production  i'ages  fell less  than  wages of sales  and service
personnel.  In Korea farm earnings tended to gain in the brief recessions
(1973-5, 1980-1), but  overall lost ground due  to  the large widening of
differentials  during  the  heavy industry  "big  push" in the  late 70's.
Finally,  two  studies  use  the  tradeable/non-tradeable  distinction  (although
the  sectoral classifications  above  could  be  translated into  tradeable/
non-tradeable  also). The  Argentina  study  found  that  relative  wages  had tended
to increase  in non-tradeables  over the  period  1940-62,  but that the (failed)
structural  adjustment  attempts  since then  had at least managed  to arrest  the
trend.  In Costa  Rica relative  wages  in importables  and  non-tradeables  fell  in
the  1980-2  recession  but  recovered  faster  during  the  ensuing  adjustment  period,
thus  maintaining  their  relative  position  overall  during  the  period.
Government  wages  seem  to  have  fallen  universally  during  adjustment,  due to34
pressures  on government  expenditures  (although  some authors suggest  that the
trends  were different  in central  government  and in the  parascatals). This is
documented in Kenva, Ghana, Egypt, Bolivia and Costa Rica.  In Malaysia
government  wages rose less rapidly than in other sectors.  Thus changes in
sectoral  wages  seem  to  have generally  supported  structural  adjustment  aims,  and
also  corroborate  the  trends  in  employment.
Six  of the  country  studies  also  examine  trends  in the  formal/informal  wage
differential. Here  wage  trends  are  likely  to  reflect  not  only  goods  prices,  but
also  the  effects  of  crowding  discussed  earlier. The  country  studies  suggest  that
the  patterns  also  depend  on institutions  in  place  in individual  countries. For
example,  the formal  sector is generally  more able to protect itself  during
anticipated  inflation,  provided that institutional  mechanisms provide full
compensation  for inflation. The informal  sector  however  is less  tightly  bound
by wage freezes,  and in periods  of unanticipated  inflation  informal  wages  are
more closely  tied  to the  goods  market.  In  countries  where  the informal  sector
thrives  because of distortions  in the formal  economy,  e.g.  Ghana,  structural
adjustment  may remove  rents  and therefore  benefit  the  formal  sector.
Crowding  seems  to  have  been  important  in  the  early  1980's  recession  in  Costa
Rica,  Chile  and  Brazil,  when the  informal  sector  did  relatively  worse.  In  Kirea
also  the  formal/informal  earnings  gap  widened  during  recessions,  likely  because
of  a  composition  effect  (the  formal  sector  shed  the  lower  paid  workers). However
in  the  Bolivian  hyperinflation,  and  during  the  Brazilian  heterodox  stabilization
under the cruzado  plan (where  there  was a combination  of a price freeze  plus
strong  demand),  informal  sector  earnings  improved  relative  to  formal  ones. The
Malaysian evidence is somewhat  mixed since male and female  wages performed
oppositely. Male self  employed  wages  rose  faster  than  employee  wages  over the35
whole period (partly explained by  the increase in education of  the self
emploved). Female  employee  wages  did  better  in the  boom  but  then fell  relative
to the self employed  during the recession (the Malaysian results are from
earnings functions,  not-  aggregate wages, unlike the results for the other
countries). The  author  of  the  Malaysia  study  suggests  that  there  were therefore
pockets  of female  informal  sector  employment  which  did not participate  in the
boom affecting  the rest  of the  economy.
Finally,  a couple  of studies  mention  skill  differentials. These  narrowed
during  inflation  and the  first  structural  adjustment  period  in  Chile (1970-76)
and  never  recovered. In Egypt  white  collar-blue  collar  differentials  narrowed
throughout  the  oil  boom and  continued  to narrow  through  the  recession  (perhaps
due to slower  growth  in the  public  sector).
Some further information  on earnings can be obtained from analyzing
earnings  functions.  Altogether  6  of  the  case  studies  present  earnings  functions,
of which four  have separate  functions  for  years  before  and -. fter  the onset  of
structural  adjustment  (Malaysia,  Costa Rica, Bolivia and Kenya).  Two other
African country studies present earnings  functions  for a single  year (Cote
d'Ivoire  and  Ghana),  although  the  Ghana study  divides  the  sample  by length  of
job tenure  which  is an ingenious  way to  get some information  on changes  in the
labor  market.  In five  cases  cherefore  (i.e.,  all  but the  Cote  d'Ivoire)  it is
possible  to  get  some  additional  information  on changes  in  sectoral,  male/female
and formal/informal  differentials,  purged of the effect of changes in human
capital  characteristics  within  sectors.  Such a correction  is important  in a
period  of large  structural  change  (see  for  example  Lavy  and  Newman's  (1989)  work
for  Cote  d'Ivoire),  or when  participation  rates  change  greatly  (see  for  example
work on the  US male-female  differential  over the  1970's).36
There  are  definite  changes  in  the  earnings  functions.  One  feature  is  that
adjuszment  seems  to  weaken  the  explanatorv  power  of  earnings  functions  (perhaps
because  mnany  of the characteristics  associated  with the formal  sector  receive
lower  rewards). The  R squareds  f-ll  in  Malaysia,  Bolivia  and  Costa  Rica (there
are  not  separate  equations  for  Ghana,  and  for  Kenya  where  the  authors  argue  that
labor  markets  did not  adjust  substantially,  R squareds  improve). Coefficients
decreased for many formal sector characteristics;  urban location  and union
(Ghana):  education,  experience,  being  married,  being male,  and being in the
formal  sector  (Bolivia);  education  and  experience  (Costa  Rica);  higher  education,
urban location  and women's  education  (Malaysia  after  the 1984  recession). In
Kenya by  contrast coefficients  on  characteristics  associated with  formal
employment  rose (age,  being  male,  formal  sector,  and the  Nairobi  premium). In
Ghana sectoral  differentials  moved in the  direction  of adjustment  (the  mining
coefficient  rose and the service  sector  coefficient  fell),  whereas in Kenya
sectoral  relative  wages  did  not  change  markedly.
The  use of  earnings  functions  is  obviously  a  useful  direction  for  further
work on labor markets and adjustment,  and in this respect the technique  of
dividing  the  sample  (as  used  in  the  Ghana  study)  seems  a  promising  way  of  teasing
out trends from a single  cross section  of data,  which might be particularly
useful  for  African  countries.
For  Ghana,  earnings  functions  suggested  a relatively  well-working  labor
market,  which complemented  the findings  from the  little  trend  data available.
Female  and  male  hourly  earnings  were  not  too  dissimilar  (although  total  earnings
differed), first and  second jobs had  similar hourly earnings (except in
agriculture),  and there  was  a premium  for  seasonal  labor.
For  Cote  d'Ivoire,  data  were  available  for  two  consecutive  years,  including37
sore.  rDeated  data  on  zhe  same  individuals.  Participation  and  employment
ti:ir.& r. Uq'.atior.s  e:  s  estmTa-ed, rather thani  earnings functions.  The panel
_'aza  sho-.:ed  that  labor  mazket -transitions  generally were towards sectors favored
by adjustment (particularlv  agriculture) and that within manufacturing there  was
a shift  towards the informal sector.  As  regards  the probability  of leaving
emplovment,  this  was higher  for women,  lower  for  the services,  higher  for
construction,  and  lower  for  the more  educated.  Likewise  higher  levels  of
education had a positive effect on the probability of entering employment  (in
contrast to the results for Asia and Latin America where structural adjustment
often  adversely  affected  earnings  and  unemployment  for  the  educated).
Unemployment  could  be relatively  persistent: of those  seeking  employment  in
1985,  81%  were still  unemployed  in 1986,  although  42%  of the  original  group  had
stopped  looking. Finally,  the  study  had  some  interesting  results  on the  effects
of crop price indexes  on work behavior  in rural  areas.  Increases in these
indexes  had  a  positive  effect  on  work  supply  for  those  who  were  both  working  and
in school  in the first  of the two  survey  years,  but a negative  effect  on work
supply  for those full time in education  in the first  year.  I.e. crop price
increases  could  increase  effort,  but not at the  expense  of interrupting  human
capital  acquisition,  an interesting  finding.
III.4  Labor  Market  Institutions
Two issues  papers  deal  with  labor  market  institutions,  Devereux's  (on  wage
indexation,  discussed  in  section  III.1  above),  and  Nelson's,  on  political  economy
issues. The  latter  paper  focusses  particularly  on the  effect  of unionism,  both
private and public,  on labor  market  flexibility. It also discusses  economic
and  political  factors  which  affect  how  militant  or  co-operative  labor  movements
are  likely  to  be.38
Nelson  argues that there are theoretical  reasons as to why unions in
developing countries might be more militant than in developed ones.  The
relationship  between  union  organization  and  militancy  is  inverted  U-shaped:  weak
unions  exhibit  a low  level  of militancy,  and  very strong  centralized  unions  are
also less militant as  they can no  longer consider only sectoral gains.
Developing  country unions fall in the middle,  with some strongly  organized
sectors  but no strong  central  union  body.  Unions  in  most developing  countries
do not fit the "corporatist"  model  where  wage gains  are traded  off for  better
employment  security  and where labor  may take account  of the macro impe'ct  of
sectoral  wage  demands. Another  feature  of  unions  in  developing  countries  is  the
greater  role  of  public  sector  unions,  due  to  the  greater  share  of  public  sector
employment  in total  formal  employment. A feature  of the  public  sector  is the
greater  difficulty  experienced  in laying  off workers,  and the large  severance
payments  offered.
Economic  factors  may  affect  labor's  intransigence:  there  tends  to  be  more
concern  for  wages in  the  upswing,  and  more  concern  for  employment  protection  in
downswings  (although  unions  foreseeing  times  getting  worse,  may  try  to  grab  what
they  can  early  in  the  downswing). Political  factors  also  matter:  authoritarian
regimes  tend  to  use  coercion  more  than  democratic  regimes  (with  some  exceptions
on both sides). The  stage  of the  electoral  cycle  matters,  as does labor's  role
in the political  and party process (labor  may be attached  to one party in a
polarized  system,  or have access  to  more than  one  party  in a more open  system,
or be largely excluded from the political arena).  Likewise the degree of
stability  of  the  regime  matters,  new  democracies  in  particular  being  susceptible
to  the  revolution  of  rising  expectations.  Nelson  makes  the  important  point  that
successful  adjustment  in the  long  run  not  only  requires  investor  confidence  in39
the  government's  long  run  abilitv  to  fulfil  its  promises,  hut  also  the  confidence
of the lIbor  movement. The degree  of equity  in a societv  may be an important
in.gredient  in sustaining  such  confidence.
The  Latin country studies  dwell at length  on labor  market institutions
(unions,  indexation,  minimum  wages,  legislation  on benefits  and job security,
and segmentation). For the  African  countries  these institutions  receive  less
coverage  in the  country  studies,  although  they  exist. As the  Kenya  study  makes
clear,  however,  it is one thing  for  the  institutions  to  exist,  and another  for
them  to  be  effective,  and  their  force  tends  to  be weakened  by the  highly  elastic
labor  supply  to urban areas  in  Africa.  It is also likely  that the  much lower
proportion  of urbanization  and  of formal  sector  employment  makes  a difference.
The Asian countries  have some similar  institutions  (2 year wage contracts  in
Malaysia,  and the  same kind of long-term  contract/temporary  labor  division  in
Korea  as  in  Brazil). However  it  is  clear  that  the  role  of  unions  in  Asia is  very
different  from  that in  Latin  America  and  Africa.
The five Latin  country  studies  provide  an interesting  contrast  in terms
of  the  alleged  effect  of labor  market  institutions  in  causing  rigidities  in the
labor  market. In three  of the  countries  (Argentina,  Brazil  and  Costa  Rica)  the
institutions  remain  strong  despite  economic  crisis,  whereas in the other two
(Bolivia  and Chile)  they have been substantially  weakened  and/or dismantled.
These institutions  are  criticized  by some  of the  country  authors  - in  Argentina
and  Brazil  it is  argued  that  they  impeded  adjustment  and  labor  market  mobility,
and in  Chile  they  receive  partial  blame  for  the  painful  nature  of the  recession
and  ensuing  high  unemployment.  At  the  same  time  the  Costa  Rica  and  Bolivia  cases
are interesting  counterpoints. In Costa Rica, labor institutions  survived
(relatively)  unscathed,  for example  there  are  over  500  minimum  wages  legislated40
which  are in the  main enforced,  which  did  not prevent  moderate  adjustment. In
Bolivia  much labor legislation  was dismantled  and large scale labor shedding
occurred  without as yet strong  recovery. To some extent it seems that labor
market institutions  are  often a  symptom of underlying political-economic
difficulties  which  make  adjustment  difficult,  and the  institutions  are  unfairly
blamed  for  causing  problems,  a  point  we return  to below.
The Brazil study describes labor market institutions  in some detail.
Unions are very strong (in the form in which they re-emerged during the
democratization  period  from  the  late  1970's  onwards),  and  are  linked  to  political
parties (along  the lines  of the corporatist  state  discussed  by Nelson). They
combine  strong  plant-level  organization  with a (previously  legislated)  rtrong
centralized  structure,  which  allows  them  to transmit  bargain  struck  at the  best
organized plants to national level.  Wage indexation is perhaps the most
sophisticated in  Latin America, with  monthly adjustments.  Job  security
legislation  used to be an important  hindrance  to  mobility,  but the  setting  up
in 1964  of a fund (to  which  employers  contribute)  to provide  severance  pay  has
eased the problem.  Tradeables  predominantly  hire formal  sector (i.e.  signed
contract),  unionized  workers,  whereas  non-tradeables  hire all types  of workers
(formal  and  informal,  unionized  and  non-unionized).
Argentina  has many of the same institutions. The author links union
strength  to inward-oriented  economic  policy,  since  the  oligopolistic  nature  of
employers  demands  an equally  centralized  representation  for  labor. The author
also mentions  a compulsory  wage policy,  whereby  bargains  struck  by the  unions
are  obligatory  for  all  firms,  which  he  argues  harmed  small  firms. One  difference
from the Brazil case is that the main exportable  in Argentina is food (see
Section  III.2),  and  unionization  is  therefore  concentrated  in  non-tradeables  (or41
importables).  This  arguably  has  been  a  major  hindrance  in  changing  the  relative
price  of tradeables  and  non-tradeables.
One difference  in Costa Rica is that although legislation  is equally
strong, unions are relatively  weak (having  been broken in an unsuccessful
face-off  with  Standard  Fruit  in  the  1970's). Wage  indexation  in  Costa  Rica,  far
from  being  an impediment  to desirable  relative  price  changes,  is given  much of
the credit for allowing  a real wage decline at a critical point following
devaluation.  Since indexation  was  imperfect,  real wages fell, but by  an
apparently impartial mechanism.  This  tactic however  can  only  be  used
infrequently,  and  Brazil  for  example  is no longer  able to  make such  gains  from
unanticipated  inflation.
Two Latin  countries  undertook  major  labor  market  reforms. Chile  between
1973  and  1975  eliminated  unions  and  job  security,  and  removed  much  of the  force
from  minimum  wages,  benefits,  and  wage indexation  mechanisms  (the  government  in
fact  cheated  on the  price index  used for  wage indexation). The author  however
argues that lack of labor legislation  in the period 1973-79 was  in fact
detrimental  to growth,  because  employers  feared  that  the law (once  reinstated)
would  be  unduly  favorable  to  labor. Bolivia  (the  other  Latin  "severe  adjustment"
case) likewise removed similar institutions  (with the exception that wage
indexation  had never been particularly  important  and had not survived the
hyperinflation  as an institution). Job  tenure  was ended and job security
reduced,  thus  allowing  labor  shedding. The  government  stepped  out  of  previously
centralized  wage bargaining. In both Chile  and Bolivia  there  was substantial
labor  shedding  from  the  public  sector,  equal  to 25%  of the  public  sector  labor
force  in Bolivia,  and 3%  of the  total  labor  force  in  Chile (the  author  does  not
specify  as to  whether  total  urban,  or total  urban  plus rural  is meant).42
Comparisons  between  the Latin  countries  in success  of  adjustment  is
instructive.  Contrasting  for  example  the  relatively  successful  adjustment  in
Costa  Rica  and the problematic  one in Bolivia,  evidently  lismantling  labor
institutions  is  neither  necessary  (Costa  Rica)  nor  sufficient  (Bolivia)  for
successful  adjustment. Another  interesting  comparison  is  between  Brazil  and
Costa  Rica. In  Brazil  there  exist  (whether  due  to  underlying  inequality  of
income  distribution  or  other  reasons)  large  political-economic  tensions  such  that
there  is no  consensus  over  the  division  of output  and  which  cause  continual
inflationary  tendencies  (tensions  which  similarly  pushed  Bolivia  over  the  brink
into  hyperinflation).  Although  wage  indexation  has  sometimes  been  blamed  for
perpetuating  Brazil's  inflation,  it  is  rather  a  symptom  of  the  defensive  ability
of  one  of  the  groups  engaged  in  underlying  conflict.  In  Costa  Rica  by  -ontrast
a  higher  degree  of  social  consensus  allowed  a  union-backed  President  to  undertake
some  of  the  painful  initial  steps  towards  successful  adjustment,  in  which  wage
indexation  actually  helped  the  process.
The Asian countries  also  have institutional  structures  in the labor
market.  The  Korean  government  has  followed  a  highly  interventionist  policy  with
respect  to  unions. The  right  to  strike  was  banned  in  1971  and  only  recently
reinstated,  and unions  need government  permission  to undertake  collective
bargaining.  The  author  argues  that  wage-productivity  trends  and  the  consequent
effect  on  unit  costs  has  been  crucial  in  Korea's  export  success.  In  this  respect
the  government  was  heavily  involved  in  ensuring  that  wages  did  not  get  ahead  of
productivity  and  at  the  same  time  that  workers  did  share  in  the  fruits  of  higher
productivity.  Increasing  union  autonomy  and  rising  strikes  in  the  late  1980's
may  herald  a  change  in  the  so  far  virtuous  productivity-wage  nexus  in  Korea.
In  Malaysia  union  power  is  similarly  limited.  The  level  of  unionization43
is low (less  than  25%  in  manufacturing),  and  unions  are  banned  in  some  sectors.
Paradoxically  unions  are strongest  in the plantation  sector  where wages have
stagnated  in the  1980's. Malaysia  has  relatively  long  (3  year)  wage  contracts,
which may  have hindered  adjustment. Unions in Thailand  are also weak, except
in the  public  sector. In both  Malaysia  and  Korea the  importance  of bonuses  in
earnings  (around  30% of pay in Korea and 15% in Malaysia)  has been argued  to
cause flexibility  since earnings  and profits are related.  (Latin  countries
similarly  have bonuses  but less related  to productivity  and profits than to
Christmas,  seniority  etc.)
Although studies of  Latin countries frequently blame  labor market
segmentation  (formal/informal)  as a problem, it is worth pointing out that
similar segmentation  exists in the Asian countries  also.  In Korea labor is
divided  into  permanent,  temporary  and  casual,  and  much  of  labor  market  adjustment
falls  upon  the  casual  and temporary  workers  (particularly  female  workers). The
segmentation  between  large  and  small  firms  is  also  quite  marked,  and  small  firms
tend  to  pick  up the  slack  during  recessionary  periods. Segmentation  also  seems
to persist  over time,  although  taking  the form  of a widening  gap in the  human
capital  levels  of large  as compared  to small  firms,  rather  than  a widening  of
wage differentials.
Finally  public sector  employment  and adjustment  is a topic worthy of
separate  study  in its  own  right. The  growth  of public  sector  employment  as an
initial  response  to  economic  crisis  is  mentioned  in  many  of the  studies  (all  of
the  Latin  studies,  Malaysia  and  Egypt). The  eventual  need  to  shed  public  sector
labor  was a difficult  undertaking. Bolivia,  Chile,  Costa  Rica and Ghana  have
"bitten  the bullet",  Argentina  has been unable to, and in Egypt,  Kenya and
Malaysia adjustment took the form of a  substantial  slowdown in government44
hiring.  In the  latter  three  countries  one  consequence  discussed  was a rise in
educated  unemployment,  particularly  of  women  in  Egypt  and  Malaysia,  where  there
are few  private  sector  alternatives  for  educated  women.  The relative  decline
in public sector  wages observed  in almost  all countries  reflects  the greater
difficulty  of adjusting  labor  quantity  in the  public  than the  private  sector.
Discussion  at the  conference  suggested  that different  areas of the  government
(parastatals  versus  central  government)  have  had  rather  different  relative  wage
experience,  but this level  of detail  was generally  not reached  in the  country
studies.
IV.  Consequences-of  Labor  Market  Adjustment
IV.1  Income  Distribution
As Addison  and  Demery  make clear,  theoretical  discussion  of the effects
of adjustment  on poverty  yields  ambiguous  predictions. Their  paper  begins  with
the standard Salter-Swan  account of expenditure  reduction and expenditure
switching,  and  works  out  wage  and  employment  effects,  assuming  competitive  labor
markets. These  wage  and  employment  effects  are  then  fed  through  a  poverty  index,
but yield  ambiguous  predictions.
The rest of the paper examines  how these effects  are modified  by the
introduction  of different  labor  market  imperfections.  The first  case is  where
there  exists  an economy  wide "quantity  rationing"  framework,  i.e.  unemployment
can persist. In this  case  the  discussion  of poverty  becomes  more complicated,
since  it is  necessary  to  consider  poverty  amongst  those  employed  in  tradeables,
those  employed  in tradeables,  and those  unemployed.  In this case although  a
devaluation  may increase  poverty  because it shifts  workers to the tradeable
sector (where  there  is assumed  to be greater  poverty),  and because it lowers
the  real  wage, it  will decrease  poverty  because  of the  unemployment  reduction.45
Thus there  is still  ambiguicy  in  predictions,  but of a different  type  from
before.
The  paper  then  moves  on to  discuss  partial  labor  market  imperfections,
dividing  the  labor  market  into  a formal  and  an  informal  sector.  The  analysis
is  similar  to  Edwards  (1988),  and  Edwards  and  Edwards.  Different  types  of  wage
inflexibility  are  considered  and  the  consequences  for  sectoral  employment,  wages,
and  unemployment  are  traced  out. These  are  again  fed  through  a  poverty  index.
Ambiguity  is  again  the  order  of  the  day,  although  the  analysis  does  illuminate
the  different  components.
A  third  variant  is  where  there  are  barriers  to  entry  into  the  formal  labor
market.  Here  Addison  and  Demery  argue  that  an  expenditure  switching  policy  is
quite  likely  to  reduce  poverty  if  there  are  barriers  to  entry  into  non-tradeables
or tradeables.  The  fourth  and final  case  is  where  there  exist  labor  market
imperfections  in  both  sectors,  and  they  distinguish  between  unemployment  and
employment  in  informal  tradeables,  formal  tradeables,  informal  non-tradeables,
and formal  non-tradeables.  They follow  through  the real  wage and labor
allocation  consequences  of  expenditure  switching,  and  again  feed  them  through
the  poverty  index. They  conclude  that  "the  effects  of switching  under  these
assumptions  seem to be the  most promising  as far as poverty  reduction  is
concerned."
Tracing  the effect  of adjustment  on poverty  and income  distribution
empirically  is no easier  than  theoretically.  It is difficult  to ask the
counterfaccual  question  as  to  what  happened  during  adjustment  as  compared  to  what
would  otherwise  have  happened,  since  many countries  were on unsustainable
courses.  The  data  available  also  affect  the  conclusions  which  can  be  reached.
It is usually  more  difficult  to obtain  information  on overall  economy-wide46
changes  in  income  distribution  (from  nationwide  income-expenditure  surveys)  than
to obtain  results  on the  urban  distribution  of earned  income  (from  labor  force
surveys). However if real  wages fall  by more than  GDP, and there  are changes
in  urban-rural  differentials,  then  the  latter  data  only  tell  part of the  story.
We focus  here on relative  earnings  distribution. Several  studies also
document  increases  in  poverty,  unsurprising  as  a  consequence  of  economic  crisis.
For  Africa  there exist almost no  time  series data with  which  to make
comparisons. The  Kenya  study  does  cite  UNICEF's  finding  that  the  share  of the
bottom 10% declined. For Egypt  there  are no distribution  data after 1981/2.
Changes in urban-rural  income  differentials  are  of great interest  in the  case
of Africa  and are the  focus  of studies  elsewhere  (Jamal  and  Weeks, 1977),  but
country  studies  here lacked  the  data to  examine  the issue.
In  Latin  America  income  distribution  is  a  key  issue  related  to  the  political
economy  of the  economic  growth  process,  and  all  studies  provided  data. Brazil's
income  distribution  has long  been  of interest  in  view  of the  fact  that inequity
increased  during  the  long  boom "economic  miracle"  period  between  1967  and  1974
(when there  was a type of structural  adjustment  as the economy  became  more
open). There  is  evidence  of  some  improvement  between  1974  and  1981,  a  worsening
again  during  the  recession  and  stabilization  (1981-85)  and  since  then  a slight
recovery. One interesting  finding  is  that  interregional  equity  improved  during
structural  adjustment,  which  hit  harder  at  the  more  affluent  urbanized  South  than
the  more rural  North  East.
For  Chile the  pattern  was somewhat  similar  but more exaggerated,  with a
sharp worsening in 1974-6 accompanying  the start of adjustment,  the Gini
remaining  constant  1976-9,  worsening  again  in  1979-84,  and  since  then  improving
slightly,  but to  a level  much  worse than  at  any time  in  the  period  1960-74. It4  7
is not surprising .hat distribution worsened so much, given the massive cuts in
real -.- ages and the very high unemployment levels.  The measured changes may be
offset somewhat by changes in social expenditures.  In Argentina  also income
distribution worsened during the  stop-go cycles (although the  only data available
are for income earners in Buenos Aires 1974-88).  The top two deciles gained at
the expense of all others.
For Bolivia and Costa Rica data are more scanty and it is harder to know
exactly what happened.  In  Costa Rica inequality possibly increased between 1971
and 1983 (before adjustment), but after the onset of adjustment different data
sources give conflicting trends.  For Bolivia data are also not very good, but
suggest a possible improvement between 1982-5 (when informal sector wages rose
relatively  during  the  hyperinflation),  but  by  1988  distribution  had  reverted  back
to 1982 levels.
In  Asia,  income  distribution  possibly  improved  in  Malaysia  and  worsened  in
both Thailand and Korea:  in Malaysia resources were put  into agriculture
including  food  agriculture,  whereas  in the  Korea  policy  focussed  for  at least
some  of the  period  on  heavy  industry,  and  in  Thailand  little  was  done  about  the
problem  of urban  primacy  (concentration  in  Bangkok).
IV.2  Women  and  Labor  Market  Adjustment
Much  of  the  literature  on  women  and  structural  adjustment  has  concentrated
on the  effects  of  structural  adjustment  on  women. Collier  examines  the  opposite
issue,  namely  how  women's  economic  mobility  may  affect  the  success  of  adjustment,
using  evidence  from  Africa. He argues  that  women  face  constraints  not only in
the  labor  market  and in access  to education,  but also in  credit  markets,  which
may  affect adjustment.  In particular, women  in  Africa are  frequently
concentrated  in  food  production. He argues  that  there  are three  possible  cases48
relevant  to  adjustment.  Food  may  be a  tradeable,  in  which  case  its  output  should
expand  with adjustment,  it may  be a nontradeable,  in which  case output  should
contract,  or it might be nontradeable  in rural areas but tradeable  in urban
areas,  in  which  case  food  marketing  (again  frequently  a  female  preserve,  at  least
in West Africa)  would need to expand.  If food crops are to contract,  this
requires  a reallocaticn  of women's  labor  into  other  activities,  and  if they  are
to  expand,  this  requires  women's  access  to  credit. In  either  c se,  constraints
on women's  flexibility  will  hinder  success  of structural  adjustment.
He thus  urges  that  government  policies  should  focus  on  relaxing  constraints
to  women's  economic  activities.  Another  reason  cited  in favor  of this  strategy
is that it also improves  household  income  security,  if higher  women's  incomes
off  set  loss  of men's  jobs  in the  formal  or government  sectors  during  adjustment
(although  he does not consider  the potential  costs involved  such as women's
responsibilities  for  children).
Bardhan's  paper  discusses  on  women  in  South  Asia,  again  focussing  on  womeen
as  participants  in,  rather  than  victims,  of  structural  adjustment.  It  deals  with
both rural and urban activities  of women, and draws somewhat  on the earlier
experience  of  women in export-oriented  industries  in East  Asia.  Bardhan  sees
structural  adjustment  as potentially  altering  the  existing  U-shaped  pattern  of
female  labor  force  participation  with education. (In  South  Asia  women tend  to
participate  either with very low education, in menial and low-productivity
activities,  or in high-skilled,  high-education  activities).  She argues  that
adjustment  may increase  demand  for labor-intensive  industry  output,  requiring
women  workers  with medium  education,  with resulting  beneficial  effects  also  on
reduced  fertility,  and increased  incentives  for female  education. Adjustment
may also involve  costs  for  women,  such  as those  where  the  male  family  member(s)49
or  the  wnole  family  migrate,  and  costs  imposed  particularly  on  women's  time  when
social  infrastructure  deteriorates.  Like  Collier,  she  sees  a  role  for  government
in  relaxing  constraints  on  women's  activity.  Labor  market  legislation  aimed  at
protecting  women  has in fact  tended  to  exclude  them  from  the  formal  sector.
Bardhan  foresees  benefits  to  women  in  selective  deregulation  of  some  sectors  in
India,  such  as  electronics.
Edwards  and Roberts  focus  rather  more on the effects  of structural
adjustment  on  women. In  Latin  America  work  on  women  seems  to  focus  mainly  on
labor  force  participation,  and  there  is  little  information  on  trends  in  relative
earnings.  Women's  labor  force  participation  has  been  increasing,  partly  due  to
sectoral  shifts  (in  particular  increased  employment  in  the  service  sector),  but
largely  due  to  higher  participation  within  sectors.  The  participation  increases
vary  somewhat  across  countries.  The  authors  undertake  econometric  analysis  for
Chile  which  suggest  that  unemployment  which  accompanies  structural  adjustment
does  not  have  differential  effects  on  discouraging  female  and  male  labor  force
participation.  One  interesting  avenue  they  suggest  for  future  work,  would  be
how increased  female  participationi  fits  in  with the  trend  in  much  of Latin
America  towards  increased  informalizat:lon  of  the  labor  force.
The country  studies  concentrate  more on the effects  of structural
adjustment  on  women. As Collier  argues,  effects  are  likely  to  depend  on the
preceding  sectoral  distribution  of female  workers  and on the effect  on
participation  rates.  There  is  however  the  likelihood  that  female  workers,  having
a  more  tenuous  attachment  to  the  labor  force,  are  more  likely  to  lose  jobs  during
periods  of labor  shedding.  The  country  studies  do  not give  a single  story,
although  there  seems  to  be  a  lot  of  evidence  of  adverse  impacts.  However,  the
data are not very complete. Even for the United  States,  where  data are50
available,  it was difficult  enough to understand  how male-female  wages for
e:ample had  changed over  time,  due  to  changes in  female  labor  force
participation. For the  developing  countries  there  have been trend  changes  in
female labor force participation  plus cyclical  responses  due to crisis (in
opposite  directions  in  different  countries). It  is  even  harder  to  trace  effects
on female  welfare  if  most  women live  in  households  with  male adults. Although
effects  on female  headed  households  are less ambiguous  to interpret  from the
data,  this  was a topic  well  beyond  the scope  of the  country  studies.
The  Ghana  study  documents  that  women  suffered  rather  more from  structural
adjustment  since  they  were concentrated  in the  informal  sector  which tended  to
absorb  excess  labor.  Women are also predominantly  in food crop agriculturA,
whereas  resources  have  gone instead  to  cash  crops. In  Cote  d'Ivoire,  in  so far
as  education  had  a  positive  effect  on  the  probability  of  remaining  in  employment,
or of entering  employment,  and  women's  education  is lower,  women  are likely  to
have faced  disadvantages.  The  Egypt  study  documents  an  adverse  effect  on  women
due  to  the  lengthening  queue  for  government  employment,  and  women's  more  limited
private  sector  alternatives  then  men's.
In Bolivia  the male-female  differential  fell  between 1981 and 1987 (as
measured  from  earnings  functions),  although  aggregate  data  suggest  the  opposite
(the difference is perhaps explained by  changes in participation rates).
Although  anecdotal  evidence  suggested  that  labor  shedding  from  the  formal  sector
was to the detriment of women (who are more costly  workers in terms of
benefits),  this  may  have  been  offset  by the  fact  that  much  of the  employment  loss
was focussed  in  mining,  a  male-dominated  sector. In  Costa  Rica the  male-female
earnings  differential  increased  during  the  crisis  and  decreased  thereafter,  which
the  authors  attribute  to rising  female  participation  during  the crisis (added51
worker  effect),  where the female  entrants  were less well qualified.  In both
Bolivia and Chile the emergency  employment  schemes  explicitly  targeted  male
workers  at  least  initially  (women  were  not  eligible  to  participate),  and  in  Chile
public  sector  hiring  in the  early  part  of the  crisis  also favored  men.
In  Malaysia  there  exists  some  evidence  that  women lost  ground  during  the
recession  due to firing  of labor in a weaker position in the labor market
(however  there  has been a trend  increase  in female  wages over the 1970's  and
1980's). Relative  earnings  of  Malay  women  in  particular  increased  between  1970
and  1984,  and  the  returns  to  female  education  and  experience  rose  absolutely  and
relative  to the  same  returns  for  men.  However  these  gains  were all  reversed  in
the  recession  1984-87. Malaysia  however  differs  from  some  of  the  other  countries
studied  in that  women are a  higher  proportion  of wage employment  than of self
employment,  and women are concentrated  in some export industries  such as
electronics. In  Korea  women  are  at  a  disadvantage,  crowded  into  low  paying  white
collar  sectors,  and  providing  a  disproportionately  high  share  of family  workers,
the  most disadvantaged  group in the labor  force.  Female  participation  rates
are  also surprisingly  low in  Korea  compared  to other  East  and South-East  Asian
countries.  Women also tended to lose out in the recession:  whereas male
employment  shifted  continuously  towards  the  permanent  category,  this  proportion
declined  for  women  during  the  recession.
IV.3  Effects  on Long  Run  Growth
Most of the  issues  papers  focus  on demand-side  effects  of adjustment  and
the  labor  market. Buffie's,  by  contrast,  highlights  the  supply  side  consequences
of fiscal contraction  and hence impacts on long-run growth.  Demand side
complications  are abstracted  from by assuming  that the economy is small and
open.  Two traded  goods (agricultural  exports  and manufactures)  are produced52
using  labor  and  capital;  manufacturing  also  requires  an intermediate  input  which
is supplied  by the public  sector.  Labor  employed  in the  public sector  and in
manufacturing  is  paid a  higher  than  competitive  wage,  and  the  rest  of the  labor
is (under)employed  in agriculture. It is assumed  that there  is a fixed  wage
differential  between  the  modern  and  the  informal/  agricultural  sectors. Capital
accumulation  dynamics  are  also  modeled.
Human  capital  is modeled  by distinguishing  between  skilled  and  unskilled
labor.  Skilled  labor  growth  is determined  by human  capital  investment  by the
government.  If factors  are complementary,  then the productivity  of unskilled
labor declines  when investment  is cut, as does the productivity  of capital.
Overall, it is shown that disinvestment  in human capital leads to capital
decumulation. Table 3  of the  paper  summarizes  the  results. The  paper  suggest
two  broad  policy  lessons. Firstly,  productive  government  investments  should  be
protected,  which requires  broadening  the tax base.  Secondly,  a more gradual
approach  to adjustment  is likely  to entail  less adverse  impacts  on productive
investments  vital for  long-run  growth.
To some extent  the  topic  of adjustment  and long-run  growth  is  a difficult
one to study  empirically,  since  many countries  are still  grappling  with short
and  medium  term  issues,  but  some  of  the  studies  provide  information  on investment
and in  particular  human  capital  investment,  discussed  by Buffie. The  Kenya  and
Cote  d'Ivoire  studies  discuss  falling  investment,  but  do  not  blame  labor  markets.
The  Argentina  study  throws  the  blame  for  stop-go  cycles  onto the inability  of
the  labor  market  to  allow  prices  of  tradeables  to  rise  relatively  in  a  sustained
way, thus  harming  long  run  growth. In  Chile  similarly  lack  of labor  legislation
(and  fears  of returning  to previous  laws  which  favored  labor)  are  assigned  the
blame  for  lack  of investment.53
As regards  human capital  investments,  the Costa  Rica study documents  a
sharp  drop in school  enrollment  during  the  crisis,  especially  at the  secondary
and  technical  level, with  likely  adverse effects  on  growth  and  also
distribution.  By contrast  no such effect was predicted from cross-section
regressions  for  Cote  d'Ivoire. In the  Asia studies  where  short  run  problems  of
adjustment  have been largely  solved,  there  was more room to focus  on long run
issues. The Malaysia  and Korea studies  examine  changing  returns  to education
and the  Thai study  examines  potential  labor  market  skill  mismatch  issues.
V.  Conclusions
This overview  has tried  to summarize  theoretical  predictions  and  country
study  experience on  two  important topics related to  labor markets and
adjustment.  Firstly,  how well have labor  markets functioned,  and have they
assisted  or impeded  macro adjustment  efforts?  Secondly,  what have been the
effects  of some  of these  adjustments  in the  labor  market?
With respect  to  the  first  issue  of labor  market  functioning,  labor  markets
have  at  least  three  allocative  functions.  They  match  workers  to  employment  (such
that overall  unemployment  levels  and real wages matter).  They also allocate
workers  between  sectors,  and  match  worker  skills  to  job requirements  (such  that
relative  wages and  employment  matter,  both for  economic  sectors,  and for  skill
categories). Labor  markets  also  provide  incentives  for  intertemporal  allocation
of resources,  specificallv  for human capital accumulation  in education  and
firm-specific  training. It is not easy to apply these  three  criteria  to the
often  descriptive  country  studies,  to  assess  how  well  or  how  badly  labor  markets
performed. By  and  large  individual  country  authors  argue  that  the  labor  markets
performed  well (although  authors  of  the  studies  for  the  big  three  Latin  countries
studied,  Brazil,  Chile  and  Argentina,  were more  critical).54
Theorv  suggests  that  labor  market  rigidities  are  only  one  of three  possible
reasons for observing unemployment.  Country experience is that with the
exception  of  Chile,  countries  have  not  had  prolonged  unemployment  despite  severe
recession.  There have however  been cyclical increases. This fits with the
presumption  that  in  developing  countries  without  unemployment  insurance  schemes,
unemplovment  is  not  an option  for  primary  household  earners  unless  the  household
is unusually  wealthy.  The evidence  on real  wages casts  considerable  doubt  on
theoretical  concerns about aggregate real wage rigidity and  labor market
inflexibility  as a hindrance to adjustment.  Real wage declines  have been
dramatic,  and  ofter.  far  greater  than  the fall  in  GDP.  For some  countries,  the
real  wage  declines  may  have  been  excessivelv  large  and  led  to  a  fall  in  domestic
demand  which inhibited  recovery.
With regard to the second  aspect  of labor  market  functioning,  sectoral
employment  shifts  have generally  been in the  desired  direction,  i.e. towards
tradeables,  although  this  generally  has  meant  that  agricultural  employment  has
increased  relatively,  and  manufacturing  employment  declined,  in  all  but  the  most
successful  countries.  Shifts of employment  into services  and commerce are
however  indicative  of  weak  GDP  growth  and  hence  growth  of  labor  demand. Sectoral
wage  changes  have  also  been  largely  in  the  appropriate  direction  (although  there
is  little  information  on  agricultural  wages), The  decline  in  relative  government
wages is one factor  is causing  relative  wages in  non-tradeables  to  decline.
Finally,  on the  intertemporal  aspect,  the  evidence  is  a  little  more  mixed.
In one  country  (Costa  Rica)  there  was  clear  evidence  that  recession  had induced
decreases  in school  enrollment,  whereas  in another  (Cote  d'Ivoire)  econometric
results  suggested  that increases  in crop prices  which  would help adjustment,
would not lead to parents pulling their children out of school.  Earnings55
functions  for  Bolivia,  Costa  Rica  and  Malavsia  showed  that  returns  to  all  formal
sector characteristics  including education and  experience declined during
adjustment. And in that government  relative  wages declined  universally,  and
government  tends  predominantly  to hire the more educated,  this  would decrease
incentives  to acquire  schooling. The country  studies  did  not discuss  another
human  capital  issue,  namely  international  migration,  although  for  at  least  three
of the  countries  (Egypt,  Cote  d'Ivoire  and  Ghana)  this  was important.
The country  studies  also  explicitly  discussed  labor  market  institutions,
thought  to be a source  of rigidity. One  possible  interpretation  would  be that
where these institutions  lack binding  force,  whether  because  of elastic  labor
supply (Africa)  or weak unions (Asia  and perhaps  Costa Rica), they were not
perceived as  obstacles to  adjustment.  Nevertheless dismantling of  the
institutions  and weakening the unions (as in Bolivia)  does not seem to be
sufficient to  ensure recovery, and  in that country imperfections  in the
functioning of  the  capital market seem  to  bear  at  least part  of  the
responsibility  for poor growth.  It was also argued here that labor market
institutions  in Latin  America  often receive  blame,  whereas they are only the
symptoms  of underlying  political-economy  problems  detrimental  to growth.
Turning  now  to  the  second  broad  topic,  that  of  the  outcomes  of labor  market
adjustment,  there  were  some  difficulties  in  separating  out  how  far  outcomes  were
due to structural  adjustment,  how far due to recession,  and how far due to
pre-existing  trends. It  seems  clear  that  severe  adjustment  in the  case  of  Chile
(high unemployment,  sharp falls in real wages, in an economy where urban
employment  predominates)  can  be very adverse  to income  distribution. Perhaps
there are some parallels  in Brazil's  worsening  during  the 1964-79  structural
change  period,  and  similarly  Korea's  heavy  industry  phase. I.e.  unless  countries56
make explicit  provision  for  poorer  groups  (such  as for  example  the  emphasis  on
food  crop  agriculture in  Malaysia) structural change can  worsen  income
distribution,  although  some  of the  changes  (improvement  in rural-urban  relative
income,  possible  improvement  in  informal-formal  relative  income)  might  militate
in  the  opposite  direction. Country  specific  factors  (success  of  indexation,  wage
and  price freezes)  also affect  distribution. The  effects  on distribution  also
depend  on level  of GDP.  There  are  no data for  Africa  to test the  hypothesis,
but it  seems  plausible  that  improving  rural-urban  terms  of trade,  and  abolishing
rents from price distortions,  as part of adjustment  programs,  could improve
income  distribution  nationally.
The  effects  on  women  might  be somewhat  country-specific  (depending  whether
women  were in tradeables  or not),  but women  are  likely  to face  adverse  effects
of the  employment  shrinkages  in  some  sectors,  due  to their  weaker  attachment  to
the  labor  market. This  was  generally  confirmed  by the  country  studies. Finally
the  effects  on long term  growth  were adverse,  but  not  directly  attributable  to
labor  market  malfunctioning.
Where should  one  go from  here?  One issue  is that the  apparently  benign
conclusion  that labor  shifted  into  tradeables  masks  the fact that in response
to structural  adjustment,  labor  has moved in the direction  opposite  to that
usually associated  with economic development. Labor has shifted  back into
agriculture,  out of manufacturing,  and  out of the  public  sector  (although  one
might  argue  that  this  latter  sector  was  too  large  given  the  level  of development
reached).  Recession plus adjustment  has  also resulted in an increase in
informalization,  increased  use  of casual  labor,  decreased  worker  benefits,  and
declines in skill and possibly education differentials. These trends are
observed  even in the most successful  adjustment  cases in Asia.  Developing57
countries  have long resisted  being  relegated  to the role of primary  producers
in the  international  economic order, and  it is unlikely that structural
adjustment  which relies  on a shift of labor into  agriculture,  is going to be
highly  sustainable.
As regards  possible  further  research,  country  study  and  some  issues  paper
authors  somewhat  pointed  the finger  of blame for adjustment  problems  onto the
capital  market  and possible  price rigidities  in the output  market.  Another
possibly  fruitful  topic  is  that  of  the  role  of  labor  market  institutions,  unions,
and political economy - something  worth examining before launching into a
wholesale advocacy of dismantling  such institutions.  Finally (as in all
empirical  research)  there  is  a  need for  better  data.  One  useful  step  would  be
to  improve  international  collation  of  labor  force  statistics,  clearly  separating
results from household  surveys  from those  of establishment  surveys.  Another
would  be to  encourage  further  analysis  of,  and  increased  accessibility  to,  labor
force  surveys,  which tend  to be more expensive  to analyze,  but yield arguably
more reliable  results.58
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Appendix
Some  Theoretical  Issues
by Dipak  Mazumdar
This appendix  is for  the  benefit  of those  readers  who are interested  in
following  up some  ideas  sketched  in  the  overview  in  Section  III.1  and  III.2,  but
not discussed in any great detail.  The models discussed  here have figured
prominently  in the literature  on adjustment  problems,  and are presented  here
because  they  have  not  been treated  in any  of the issues  papers.
A.1  Model  of Wage  Level  and Its  Effect  on  Aggregate  Demand
In  Section  III.1  of  the  overvie-w  the  difference  between  the
"exhilarationist"  and  Istagnationist"  economies made by Taylor (1988)  was
discussed. The distinction  made between  the two scenarios  can be illustrated
a bit more precisely  with the aid of Figure 1.  The investment  and savings
functions  (I,  and  S) show the  rates  of investment  and  savings  (relative  to the
current  stock  of capital)  varying  with the  rate  of profit. The  positive  slope
of  the savings function reflects the behavioral assumption  of  the higher
propensity  to save of profit  earners.  The investment  function  also shows a
positive  relationship  with profitability,  but its  position  in the  graph,  as  we
shall  see,  in  more detail  soon  depends  on  other  factors,  notably,  the  degree  of
capital  utilization  in the economy.  Note that for stability  the investment
schedule  has to  be flatter  i.e.  investment  responds  less  to changes  in the  rate
of  profit  than  savings. The  line  in  the  Southeast  quadrant  makes  the  point  that
with a given  capital  shock,  a higher  rate  of profit  must  be associated  with a
higher  level  of output,  Q.  The initial  equilibrium  is at (ro 0 Qo). Suppose  now
there  is a cut in  wages.  The  nature  of the  new  equilibrium  depends  on the  way
the investment  function  shifts in response  to the increase  in the share of62
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profits.  If  it  rotates downwards, as  shown in  Figure 1, we  have  the
stagnationist  scenario  of  a lower  profit  rate  and  output  in  the  new  equilibrium.
In the  alternative  case, the  increased  supply  of savings  eases the  bottleneck
in the  capital  market  and the investment  schedule  rotates  upwards,  leading  to
a higher  rate  of profit  and output  in the  new equilibrium.
A  Stagnationlst  Model
The  stagnationist  case  has  been  discussed  formally  by Dutt (1984),  and  it
might  be helpful  for  some  readers  to follow  the  specifics  of the  mechanism.
Dutt's  investment  function  is  defined  as:
I/K  - a +  br +  cak  Q/K
-(1)
Investment  responds  positively  to the rate of profit  so that b is positive.
The last term  makes  investment  a function  of capacity  utilization.
We  have  K <  akQ
-(2)
where  ak is the  accelerator  or equilibrium  capital/output  ratio.  The equality
in (2)  defines  the  full  capacity  level  of output. If output  is  less  than this,
the  existing  stock  of capital  is underutilized.  As excess  capacity  increases,
the  investment  rate falls,  so that  in (1)  the  co-efficient  "c"  is  positive.
We now  need to  establish  a  relationship  between  the  profit  margin  and  the
degree  of  capacity  utilization.  Dutt  assumes  the  Kalecki  "mark-up"  pricing  rule:
P  - (I  + T) wa,  -(3)
where  p - unit  price64
T - rate of mark up
w - wage rate
aL  - amount  of labor  used in  producing  a unit  of output
(Note  that labor  is the  only  variable  factor  of production).
This implies  that  the  rate  of profit  r is:
r - T Wal  Q/pK  -(4)
From (3)  and (4)  we have:
Q/K - [(1 + T) /  TI r  -(5)
Thus as the mark-up t increases,  for a given rate of profit, the degree  of
capital  utilization  falls (excess  capacity  increases). In terms  of Figure  1,
the investment  curve  rotates  downward.
Intuitively,  the mechanism of this particular  stagnationist  story is
clear.  An increase  in  T implies  an increase  in price  and fall in real  wages.
The resultant  fall in consumer  demand  reduces  output, which reduces  the  rate
of capital  utilization,  and  subsequently  investment.
The model can also yield  an exhilarationist  scenario  if we allow  for a
change  in  the  sign  of the  co-efficient  "c"  in  the  investment  function  (1)  as  the
utilization  ratio  aK  Q/K  changes. At  a  high  level  of utilization  exceeding,  say,
u*, bottlenecks  develop which increase  the demand for finance,  particularly
working  capital.  In an imperfect  capital  market  the availability  of cash or
savings  within  the firms  is critical. Thus,  above  the level  of u*, c becomes
negative. An increase  in the  profit  margin,  by reducing  the  utilization  ratio,
helps  to increpse  the  supply  of savings  and  has  a positive  impact  on the  firm's65
investment  demand.
The Micro  vs.  Macro  Effects  of  Wage  Variation
In the  discussion  above,  we have not referred  at all to the  effects  of
wage variation  on wage changes  in employment  (and  output)  as it  works through
the  equation  of  marginal  value  product  to  the  wage rate. This  mechanism,  fully
described  in microeconomics  texts,  works  through  the  substitution  of labor  for
capital  as wages  fall;  or, in the  short  run,  the  use  of more labor  with a fixed
capital  stock. The  relationship  between  this  microeconomic  effect  and  the  macro
effect  of changes  in  wage share  discussed  above  should  now  be made clear.
Figure  2 (a)  shows  the  marginal  value  product  curve  of labor  which  is the
downward sloping demand curve for labor.  If we concentrate  only on the
micro-effects  of wage changes, then this schedule  would determine the way
employment  increases  as the  wage slides  down the  Y-axis. But the  macro-effect
emphasized  earlier  shifts  the  MPL  curve  as the  share  of  wages  in  output  changes.
If  wage falls  in a "stagnationist"  scenario,  and  the  price  level  is  unchanged,
the increase  in the  share  of profits  will shift  the  MPL curve  downwards. This
will tend to decrease  employment  with the fall in wages and offset  the  micro
effect. The  net outcome  will  depend  on the  relative  strength  of the  micro  and
macro  effects  working  in opposite  directions. If the  micro effect  dominates,
we will still  get  an increase  in  employment,  but  smaller  than  without  the  macro
effect. Thus,  the "net"  demand  curve  for  labor  would  be less  elastic  as shown
by the  broken  ML curve  in Figure  2(a). On the  other  hand,  over  a certain  range
the  micro  effect  will be  weak,  and  the  macro  effect  dominates. Thus  we get  the
"stagnationist"  production  of a  net  falU  in employment  with a fall  in the  share
of wages.
The  relationship  is  shown  in  Figure  2 (b). Below  the  level  of  employment,65
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E*, corresponding  to the  utilization  ratio  u*, an increase  in  wages increases
emplovment  as the  macro  effect  dominates. The function  can  be expected  to be
non-linear,  showing  diminishing  relative  effect  of the  macro factor  as E* is
approached. To the  right  of E*,  the  micro  effect  dominates,  and  we have a  more
regular  demand  curve  for  labor  as in Figure  2 (a).
A.2  The Exchange  Rate-Wage  Tradeoff  in  an Inflationary  Setting
In  the  literature on  adjustment relating to  Latin  America,  the
interrelationship  among exchange  rates,  wages and inflation  rate has been a
central focus of attention.  A  formal model presented  by Cardoso seeks to
elucidate  the  various tensions  in the  balance  of forces  discussed  in Section
III.2  in the  overview. We give  a  brief  intuitive  summary  of this  model  in this
section.
The model starts with the assumption  that the growth of output is
constrained  by the supply  of capital (savings)  rather  than  by demand  (i.e.  in
terms  on  the  distinction  made  above  the  economic  scenario  is  an "exhilarationist"
one.)  The share  of wages in value  added  has a direct  effect  on total  savings
and  hence  the  growth  rate  of output. The  exchange  rate  also  affects  the  output
growth  from  two  angles: first,  the  higher  the  value  of the  currency  the  greater
the trade deficit  which--if it can be sustained--increases  foreign savings
(borrowing)  in the  economy.  Secondly,  a higher  value  of the  currency  reduces
the  cost of intermediate  inputs,  and  effectively  increases  the  marginal  impact
of savings  on output  growth.
While the supply  of savings  thus determines  the  real rate of growth  of
output, money supply grows at a  rate determined  by  the government.  The
difference  between the two determines  the inflation  rate.  Government  policy
impinges  on the  real  growth  rav  insofar  as the  rate  of inflation  affects  both67
the real exchange  rate and the share of wages.  In  this model, there is an
equilibrium  relation  between  the  wage  share,  the  rate  of inflation,  and  the  real
exchange  rate.
To take the exchange rate first:  It is assumed that the government
pursues  a  policy  of  minidevaluations  such  that  the  real  exchange  rate  is  adjusted
to what is perceived  to be the equilibrium  exchange  rate at which the trade
balance  is zero.  There is,  however,  a sluggishness  in the  adjustment  process.
Thus the higher the  rate of  inflation, the higher will be  the  rate of
depreciation,  but  not  to  the  full  extent  to  maintain  a  constant  value  of  the  real
exchange  rate. Thus,  the  value  of the  real  exchange  rate  increases.  The  degree
of sluggishness  in  the  adjustment  mechanism  determines  the  slope  of the  downward
sloping  relationship  shown  in  Figure  3  between  the  inflation  rate (p.),  and  the
real exchange  rate (e).' The real  exchange  rate,  however,  in its  turn  affects
the growth  rate of real output, and hence,  given the exogenous  money supply
growth,  the inflation  rate.  When the real  value of the currency  is low, the
trade  deficit  shrinks  and  there  is  a fall  in  foreign  savings. At the  same  time,
the  cost  of intermediate  inputs  increases,  so that  on  both counts  the  real  rate
of growth  of output  falls.  Inflation  rate increases.  This relationship  is
portrayed  in  Figure  3  as the  upward  sloping  curve  showing  the  impact  of c  on p .
There is  a  different  upward  sloping  curve  for  each  value  of the  exogenous  money
supply  growth,  and the  slope  of this  curve is determined  by the  parameters  of
the  equation  determining  output  growth. There  is  thus  a  unique  value  of  the  real
exchange  rate  for  each  rate  of inflation  as  given  by the  intersection  of the  two
1 Note that a higher  value of C  in the diagram  denotes  real devaluation








There is  similarly  a two-way  relationship  between  the rate of inflation
(p  )  and  the  share  of  wages  in  output  (X).  In  the  inflationary  economy  wages  are
indexed,  but in the  absence  of instantaneous  adjustment,  the  higher  the  rate  of
inflation,  the  lower  is the  share  of wages.  The slope  of the  downward  sloping
curve  showing  this  relationship  in  Figure  4 is determined  by the  parameters  of
the  indexation  formula  (including  the  periods  of  adjustment).  At the  same  time,
the  share  of  wages,  by influencing  the  rate  of savings  is  negatively  related  to
output  growth  and  hence  positively  to  the  rate  of  inflation. This  is the  upward
sloping curve in Figure 4.  The intersection  of the two curves shows the
equilibrium  wage share and rate of inflation  for a particular  money supply
growth.
In full equilibrium,  the economy  adjusts  co a stable  rate of inflation
which  is  associated  with  particular  values  of  the  real.  exchange  rate  and  the  wage
share.  The way  this interrelationship  works itself out could perhaps be
understood  intuitively  from Figure  5 borrowed  from Cardoso.  If money supply
growth is given, then a given rate of inflation  will be associated  with a
particular  rate of growth  of output--which  can be determined  by alternative
combinations  of e and  w.  If  increases,  output  falls,  so that  w has to fall
to keep it constant. To find  the  unique  combination  of inflation  rate, e  and w
which  will  keep  the  system  in  equilibrium  we  have  to  consider  the  different  ways
in  which the  inflation  rate  affects  e and  w.  Focus  first  on the  exchange  rate
adjustment  process. The line e'  - 0 shows  alternative  values  of  e and w which
keep  the  real  exchange  rate  and  the  real  rate  of  growth  of  output  constant. Now
turn to the wage adjustment  mechanism.  The line  w' - 0 similarly shows
alternative  values of  e  and w  associated  with a constant  labor  share  and68a
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output  growth. The intersection  of the  two  lines  gives  the  equilibrium  values
of e  and w  which  will  be consistent  with the  particular  growth  in output  (and
rate  of inflation),  given  the  parameter  values  of  the  different  equations  in  the
model.  For  stability,  it is  clear  that  the line w'  - 0 has to be steeper.
We can then  see  that  corresponding  to the  three  key  variables  which  need
to attain  equilibrium  values  simultaneously,  there  are three  constraints  which
might become binding because of exogenuus changes and make an equilibrium
solution  unattainable.  First,  a  particular  value  of the  real  exchange  rate  which
the simultaneous  equilibrium  requires  may be unsustainable  of the foreign
borrowing  nceded  to finance  the trade  deficit.  Secondly,  the share  of wages
required  for equilibrium  may not be acceptable  to workers  or their  political
representatives.  Finally,  the  rate  of inflation  which  may be needed  to attain
the  required  overvaluation  of the  exchange  rate  and/or  the  share  of  wages  in  net
income  may destroy  confidence  in the  currency  or be economically  disruptive  in
other  ways.
Brazil  in the 70s  was able to maintain  a high rate of growth  because  a
level  of real  exchange  rate  could  be  sustained  with  the  help  of easily  available
foreign  borrowing. The  authoritarian  regime  also  permitted  the  share  of wages
to be depressed  in a  way that the  inflation  rate  did  not need to  be excessive.
The increase  in oil  prices  was equivalent  to a sharp  deterioration. The same
savings  rate  would  now  be  associated  with  a  lower  output  growth  of  Brazil's  terms
of trade. Brazil  thus  necded  a larger  overvaluation  of  the  exchange  rate  and/or
a  fall  in the  share  cf wages  to  sustain  the  same  rate  of growth  of output. But
neither  solution  was feasible. The  loss  oi confidence  of foreign  lenders  meant
that  any  increase  in  trade  deficit  which  further  overvaluation  would  entail  was
not possible. At the  same time  a change  in the  political  system  implied  that70
anv serious cut in the share of wages was unacceptable.  Attempts to maintain
the private  profitability  of  producers  through various  forms  of  government
subsidies only destabilized the  fiscal system, fueling the inflationary process.
Th:- is at the heart of the story of the failure of stabilization policies  in
Brazil in the mid-80s.PRE  Working  Paoer  Series
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